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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes, Mattel’s Barbie, and the Perfect 
10 website share several characteristics.  The famous literary character, the 
iconic doll, and the adult website are each protected by copyright, their 
copyright owners have been litigious, and each has been involved in an 
infringement suit that resulted in the award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing 
party.1  These fee awards served similar purposes, such as deterring frivolous 
infringement claims and compensation for warding off those claims.  The 
courts, however, relied on different sources of authority to justify the awards; 
the Sherlock Holmes and Perfect 10 decisions turned to the Copyright Act’s 
provision on attorney’s fees, 17 U.S.C. § 505,2 while the court in the Barbie 
litigation turned to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.3  The courts 
might also have supported the fee awards by turning to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 under 
which a court may require an attorney who unreasonably and vexatiously 
multiplies a proceeding to personally satisfy attorney’s fees.4  Another option, 
albeit rarely invoked, is to rely on their inherent equitable powers.5 
                                                                                                                  
 1 In the Barbie litigation, the copyright owner, Mattel, recovered the fees from plaintiff’s 
counsel while the Perfect 10 website and the Doyle Estate were on the losing side.  See, e.g., 
Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2002); Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate Ltd., 761 
F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 2014); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54063 (C.D. 
Cal. Mar. 24, 2015). 
 2 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012) (providing that reasonable fees may be awarded to the prevailing party). 
 3 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2), (4) (authorizing the award of attorney’s fees as a sanction).  
 4   Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the 
United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any 
case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy 
personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred 
because of such conduct. 
28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012).  See, e.g., 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 264 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(holding defendants’ copyright infringement counterclaim to be without merit but the case was 
remanded so the trial court could calculate the fee award while considering whether a defendant’s 
misconduct was akin to bad faith).  
 5 See, e.g., Scholastic, Inc. v. Stouffer, 221 F. Supp. 2d 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (declaratory 
judgment action; defendant’s fraudulent submissions and intentional bad faith warrants an award 
of $50,000 in attorney’s fees as a sanction under the court’s inherent authority); Eastway Const. 
Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating that a court can turn to its 
inherent  equitable powers or Rule 11 to support an award of attorney’s fees “[a]part from the 
statutory provisions allowing for the shifting of litigation costs . . .”).  See also infra notes 101–20 
and accompanying text.  There is overlap between Rule 11, section 1927 and a federal court’s 
inherent power to sanction.  Danielle Kie Hart, And the Chill Goes On – Federal Civil Rights Plaintiffs 
Beware: Rule 11 Vis-à-vis 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the Court’s Inherent Power, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 645, 
655 (2004). 
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The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc.6 resolved “an interesting disagreement” over when it is appropriate to award 
attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant under Section 505 of the Copyright 
Act7 and ended a perceived ‘venue advantage’ for losing plaintiffs in some 
jurisdictions.8  The Court ruled unanimously in Kirtsaeng that courts correctly 
give substantial weight to the question of whether the losing side had a 
reasonable case to fight, but that the objective reasonableness of the losing 
side’s position does not give rise to a presumption against fee shifting.  It said 
that other factors should also be taken into account, beyond the reasonableness 
of litigating positions, when a court exercises its discretion to award fees under 
the Copyright Act.9  This decision underscores that the courts have broad 
discretion in making fee awards.10  This Article will touch on some aspects of 
the Kirtsaeng attorney’s fees decision; but focuses primarily on alternative bases 
for awarding attorney’s fees to prevailing defendants in copyright infringement 
cases: Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and a federal court’s inherent equitable powers. 
There are scores of reported decisions and considerable commentary on 
awarding fees to prevailing defendants under the Copyright Act, and many of 
the cases awarding fees emphasize that the losing party pursued the claim in bad 
faith, that the claim was frivolous or objectively unreasonable, that the losing 
party delayed a hearing on the merits in order to run up the opposing party’s 
costs, or that the losing party had no reasonable grounds for the position it took 
during the litigation.11  Although there are fewer reported decisions where Rule 
11, Section 1927, or inherent authority were used to justify awarding fees to a 
prevailing defendant, the courts awarding attorney’s fees often describe the 
same kind of litigation misconduct which warrants fees under Section 505 of 
                                                                                                                  
 6 136 S. Ct. 1979 (2016). 
 7 CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 946–47 (9th ed. 2013). 
 8 Cf. Mannatt Phelps & Philips, The Supreme Court Agrees to Review the Standard for 
Awarding Attorney’s Fees to a Prevailing Party in Copyright  Infringement Suits, AIPLA 
Newsstand April 19, 2016; PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 794 (Jan. 22, 2016).  The 
Second Circuit’s decision is at 605 Fed. Appx. 48 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 9 Kirtsaeng, 136 S. Ct. at 1988; Anandashankar Mazumdar, Sup. Ct. Offers Mixed Ruling on 
Copyright Legal Fees, Bloomberg BNA IP L. Resources Ctr., 92 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 
(BNA) 590 (June 16, 2016); Copyright L. Rep. (CCH), No. 460, at 1–2 (July 19, 2016). 
 10 Scott Graham, Copyright Fee-Shifting Clarified, NAT’L L.J., June 20, 2016, at 1; Copyright L. 
Rep. (CCH) No. 460, at 2 (explaining that the Court noted, and the parties agreed, that Section 
505 grants courts wide latitude to award fees based on a totality of the circumstances).  
 11 See generally MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.10[D][1] 
(Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2017).  This treatise concludes that blame (culpability) is still a reliable 
indicium for the award of attorney’s fees. Id. at 14-218. 
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the Copyright Act.12  In short, in some infringement cases there can be 
substantial overlap in the factors pertinent to Rule 11, Section 1927, inherent 
authority, and Section 505; the Copyright Act’s fee shifting provision.  This 
helps explain similarities between the attorney’s fees which may be assessed 
under each authority.13  
This Article concentrates on analyzing the Rule 11, Section 1927 and 
inherent authority decisions in which attorney’s fees were awarded in copyright 
infringement actions14 in order to provide some guidance on what constitutes a 
frivolous claim, an objectively unreasonable claim, or a claim inconsistent with 
the purpose of the Copyright Act.  Most importantly, the article explains when 
a prevailing defendant might seek sanctions under Rule 11, Section 1927 or 
inherent power in lieu of, or in addition to, seeking fees under Section 505 of 
the Copyright Act.  It first summarizes how Section 505 of the Copyright Act, 
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and inherent 
authority to sanction have been interpreted and applied to justify awarding 
attorney’s fees to prevailing defendants.  It then discusses the similarities and 
differences between these bases for shifting fees and offers guidance for 
selecting a particular basis, or perhaps seeking fees under several bases 
simultaneously.15  
This Article acknowledges that many cases in which attorney’s fees are 
awarded under Section 505 will not support an award of fees under Rule 11, 
Section 1927 or inherent authority.  It asserts, however, that in those instances 
                                                                                                                  
 12 The Kirtsaeng decision leaves the award of fees under Section 505 primarily to the trial court’s 
discretion and added some guidelines for when fee shifting would be proper including, along with 
objective reasonableness as the principal guiding element, the losing party’s litigation misconduct 
no matter how reasonable the claim or defense might be, the need to deter repeated instances of 
infringement, and the over-aggressive assertion of claims even if the losing party’s position was 
reasonable in a particular case.  If a party has a legitimate defense to an infringement claim and 
acts reasonably in defending itself, it should not pay fees if it loses.  On the other hand, a losing 
party asserting frivolous and vexatious claims should pay the winning side’s attorney’s fees.  
Kirtsaeng, 136 S. Ct. at 1988–89; Mazumdar, supra note 9; Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) No. 460, at 3.   
 13 In essence, they often apply to the same kind of conduct.  Lieb v. Topstone Industries, Inc., 
788 F.2d 151, 156–58 (3d Cir. 1986); 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 264 (2d Cir 
2015).  See also Burger-Moss v. Steinman, 127 F.R.D. 452, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“By putting 
defendants to the effort and expense of preparing the joint motion for summary judgment, 
counsel for the plaintiffs unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied the proceedings, making an 
award of attorney’s fees appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.  The signing of the joint pre-trial 
order was a clear violation of Rule 11 as well.”). 
 14 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 11, § 14.10[B][1][d] (noting that copyright litigants 
sometimes obtain fees under provisions other than Section 505 of the Copyright Act with the 
most prominent being Rule 11). 
 15 See, e.g., Lieb, 788 F.2d at 156–58.  
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in which a court can conclude that a plaintiff’s copyright claim is frivolous or 
objectively unreasonable to justify a fee award under Section 505, there might 
well be significant overlap with the standard justifications for awarding fees 
under Rule 11 and/or Section 1927, and sometimes under inherent authority.  
In these ‘overlap’ cases, if the prevailing party and the court want to punish and 
deter opposing counsel instead of visiting his or her sins on the plaintiff, then it 
would be appropriate to turn to Rule 11 and its provisions on sanctions, or to 
28 U.S.C. § 1927, both of which support imposing the fees on counsel, instead 
of relying on Section 505 of the Copyright Act, which imposes the fees on the 
losing party.  Moreover, if the misconduct is serious enough the court might be 
able turn to Rule 11, Section 1927 or inherent powers along with Section 505 to 
hold the losing counsel and his or her client jointly and severally liable for 
attorney’s fees and costs.16 
II.  AWARDING ATTORNEY’S FEES TO ‘PREVAILING’ ALLEGED INFRINGERS 
A.  THE COPYRIGHT ACT’S FEE SHIFTING PROVISION 
Section 505 of the Copyright Act provides: 
In any civil action under this title, the court in its discretion may 
allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party other than 
the United States or an officer thereof.  Except as otherwise 
provided by this title, the court may also award a reasonable 
attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.17 
                                                                                                                  
 16 See, e.g., Burger-Moss v. Steinman, 127 F.R.D. 452, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Fharmacy Records 
v. Nassar, 572 F. Supp. 2d 869, 881 (E.D. Mich. 2008); cf. Mahan v. Roc Nation, LLC, 2016 
Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 30,986 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (fee award against the losing plaintiff was 
warranted under Section 505 but the losing plaintiff’s counsel was not jointly and severably liable 
for the fees because his conduct was not in bad faith).  In some circumstances, a lawyer’s license 
to practice might be suspended as a result of his or her misconduct during litigation.  For 
instance, a lawyer’s license to practice in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania was suspended for 
three months and a day after misconduct in copyright infringement claim against Usher.  Amanda 
Bronstad, Fee Request Turned Aside in Led Zeppelin Copyright Case, LAW.COM, Aug. 9, 2016, http:// 
www.law.com/sites/almstaff/2016/08/09/fee-request-turned-aside-in-led-zeppelin-copyright-ca 
se/?slreturn=20170105215508. 
 17 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012).  Pre-infringement registration of the copyright, or registration within 
a three months post-publication grace period, is a prerequisite to an award of attorney’s fees.  17 
U.S.C. § 412 (2012).  Note that the attorney’s fees provision in the patent statute provides that 
“[t]he court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”  35 
U.S.C. § 285 (2012) (emphasis added). 
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This fee-shifting statute overcomes the American rule that each party in 
litigation pays their own attorney’s fees.18  The statute does not contain a list of 
factors a judge should consider in exercising discretion to award fees to the 
prevailing party, and Congress did not explain why a fee-shifting provision was 
included in the current statute or in the 1909 Copyright Act.19  In any event, fee 
awards play a part in making sure all litigants have access to the courts to 
vindicate their rights under the Copyright Act: they prevent infringements from 
going unchallenged when there is otherwise little economic incentive to litigate, 
they penalize the losing party, and they compensate the prevailing party.20  The 
fee award is paid by the party; not his or her attorney.21 
The Copyright Act’s fee shifting provision restricts awards to the “prevailing 
party” but does not provide a definition.22  The Supreme Court helped 
somewhat by stating that a prevailing party is one that succeeds “on any 
significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties 
sought in bringing suit.”23  Notwithstanding the lack of a precise rule for 
making fee determinations, courts routinely awarded attorney’s fees to 
prevailing plaintiffs.24 However, for many years when the prevailing party was 
                                                                                                                  
 18 Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 247–58 (1975); 
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967).  In contrast, 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) provides that unless otherwise provided by statute, the 
prevailing party in a lawsuit shall be awarded its costs.  The expenses a court may tax as a cost 
under this authority are defined at 28 U.S.C. § 1920 and include fees of the clerk and marshal, fees 
for printed or electronically recorded transcript, witness fees, and docket fees. 
 19 The old law, 17 U.S.C. § 40, provided that “the court may award to the prevailing party a 
reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.”  There is little legislative history for either of these 
fee shifting provisions.  Peter Jaszi, 505 And All That – The Defendant’s Dilemma, 55 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 107–08 (1992). 
 20 Quinto v. Legal Times of Washington, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 579, 581 (D.D.C. 1981). 
 21 Fharmacy Records v. Nassar, 572 F. Supp. 2d 869, 881 (E.D. Mich. 2008). 
 22 It is assumed to be self-defining.  NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 11, § 14.10[B][3] (noting 
that sometimes there is uncertainty about whether a party is the prevailing party even though 
section 505 has been interpreted and applied in many decisions). 
 23 Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemore, 581 F.2d 
275, 278–79 (1st Cir. 2002)).  See also Magder v. Belton Lee, Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 30,809 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (noting that defendant is not a prevailing party when the plaintiff dismisses 
without prejudice because the action is not judicially sanctioned, but voluntary, and does not 
change the relationship between the parties); EMI Blackwood Music, Inc. v. KTS Karaoke, Inc., 
2016 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 30,964 (2d Cir. 2016) (stating that defendant whose issuance 
carrier paid over $1 million to music publisher to settle infringement claims in exchange for 
dismissal of claims with prejudice is not a prevailing party); Wolf v. Travolta, 2016 Copyrightable 
L. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 30,923 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (granting no fee award to defendant because success 
was based on the statute of limitations defense and not the merits of the copyright). 
 24 Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 (1994); Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ’g 
Co., 240 F.3d 116, 121–22 (2d Cir. 2001).  See, e.g., Scorpio Music v. Victor Willis, Copyright L. 
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the alleged infringer some courts tended to award attorney’s fees only after 
determining that the plaintiff brought the action in bad faith or that the claim 
was frivolous.25  This difference in approaches presented a dilemma for persons 
threatened with a suit, or actually sued.  If the defendant had a meritorious 
defense to what appeared to be a non-frivolous claim, should the alleged 
infringer defend vigorously and possibly have to absorb his or her attorney’s 
fees even if he wins, or would it be wiser to settle?26  This more favored 
treatment status for prevailing plaintiffs on the recovery of attorney’s fees was 
overruled in 1994 by the U.S. Supreme Court in Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.27  
John Fogerty, the lead singer and songwriter for Creedence Clearwater 
Revival, allegedly infringed his own song Run Through the Jungle when he wrote 
The Old Man Down the Road.28  The jury returned a verdict for Fogerty, and he 
sought reasonable attorney’s fees under Section 505.  The trial court denied the 
motion and the Ninth Circuit affirmed explaining that fees were not appropriate 
because Fantasy’s suit was neither frivolous nor brought in bad faith as required 
by the circuit’s ‘dual standard’ for awarding attorney’s fees to successful 
defendants.29  Under this standard, successful plaintiffs were treated better than 
prevailing defendants.30  The Supreme Court pointed out that “some Courts of 
Appeals followed the so-called ‘even-handed’ approach in which no distinction 
was made between prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants.”31  The Court 
then abolished the dual standard and simultaneously emphasized that the award 
of attorney’s fees should not be automatic for any prevailing party in view of 
the “may award” language in Section 505.32  It stated: 
 Because copyright law ultimately serves the purpose of 
enriching the general public through access to creative works, it is 
peculiarly important that the boundaries of copyright law be 
                                                                                                                  
Dec. (CCH) ¶ 30,821 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (holding that an award of attorney’s fees is justified to 
encourage authors like Willis of the Village People to assert their rights to regain their copyright 
interests and to deter production companies from interfering with those rights).  See generally 
MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 467–68 (5th ed. 2012). 
 25 LEAFFER, supra note 24, at 467–68. 
 26 Jaszi, supra note 19, at 109.  
 27 510 U.S. 517 (1994); LEAFFER, supra note 24, at 468.  
 28 Fogerty wrote Run Through the Jungle in 1970 and sold publishing rights to the predecessor of 
Fantasy Records.  Fogerty later wrote The Old Man Down the Road which was released and 
distributed by Warner Brothers Records.  Fantasy sued for infringement alleging that this song 
was merely Run Through the Jungle with new words. 
 29 Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 521. 
 30 Id. at 520.  The Ninth Circuit’s decision is at 984 F.2d 1524 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 31 Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 521. 
 32 LEAFFER, supra note 24, at 468. 
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demarcated as clearly as possible.  To that end, defendants who 
seek to advance a variety of meritorious copyright defenses 
should be encouraged to litigate them to the same extent that 
plaintiffs are encouraged to litigate meritorious claims of 
infringement.33 
The Court also rejected Fogerty’s argument for adopting the so-called 
‘British Rule’ that prevailing plaintiffs and defendants should be awarded 
attorney fees as a matter of course,34  emphasizing that “the court may award a 
reasonable attorney’s fee” language in the statute connoted discretion.35  It 
explained that Congress could not have intended to adopt the British Rule 
given the fact that it “legislates against the strong background of the American 
Rule” under which the parties bear their own attorney’s fees unless Congress 
provides otherwise.36 
In remanding the case to the Ninth Circuit37 the Supreme Court 
acknowledged that there was no precise rule or formula to guide a court in 
exercising its discretion on awarding fees to a prevailing party, but that 
“equitable discretion should be exercised ‘in light of the considerations we have 
previously identified.’ ”38  The Court listed in a footnote some of the factors 
courts should consider:  
These factors include ‘frivolousness, motivation, objective 
unreasonableness (both in the factual and in the legal 
components of the case) and the need in particular circumstances 
to advance considerations of compensation and deterrence.’  Lieb 
v. Topstone Industries, Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 156 (1986).  We agree 
that such factors may be used to guide courts’ discretion, so long 
as such factors are faithful to the purposes of the Copyright Act 
                                                                                                                  
 33 510 U.S. at 527.  The Court said that Fogerty’s successful defense of his song increased 
public exposure to a musical work that could lead to further creative pieces.  This furthered the 
policies of the Copyright Act just as much as a successful infringement claim by a copyright 
holder. Id. 
 34 Id. at 533. 
 35 Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 505). 
 36 Id. at 533–34. 
 37 Id. at 534–35.  The remand was necessary because Fogerty, as a prevailing defendant, had 
been held to a more stringent standard than a prevailing plaintiff.  
 38 Id. at 534 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436–37 (1983)). 
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and are applied to prevailing plaintiffs and defendants in an 
evenhanded manner.39 
An “interesting disagreement” developed after Fogerty was decided in 199440 
over how courts should weigh and apply these nonexclusive factors in deciding 
whether to award fees to a prevailing defendant.41  Some circuits said there is a 
strong presumption in favor of fees for a meritorious defense or that the grant 
of fees is the rule rather than the exception.42  In other circuits, however, a 
                                                                                                                  
 39 Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 & n.19 (1994).  On remand the District Court 
awarded Fogerty $1.3 million in attorney’s fees even though Fantasy’s infringement suit was not 
frivolous or brought in bad faith.  The Ninth Circuit affirmed.  Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 94 F.3d 
553 (9th Cir. 1996).  But see 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2016) (authorizing the award of attorney’s fees to the 
prevailing party in patent litigation in exceptional cases).  The Supreme Court recently interpreted 
this statute in Octane Fitness v. Icon Health & Fitness, 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014), and made important 
changes to how attorney’s fees are to be awarded in patent cases.  It rejected a rigid formula for 
determining when a case was exceptional that had been used by the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, and directed courts to exercise full discretion when evaluating whether a case was 
exceptional.  In a companion case, Highmark v. Allcare Health Management Systems, 134 S. Ct. 1744 
(2014), the Court held that the Federal Circuit  should no longer exercise de novo review of a 
district court’s award of fees under the patent statute.  Prior to the Supreme Court’s rulings it was 
unlikely for a defendant in a patent case to receive an award of attorney’s fees absent a finding of 
inequitable conduct or separately sanctionable litigation misconduct.  As a result of these 
companion decisions, it should be easier for district courts to shift fees to prevailing alleged 
infringers if the court concludes that the litigation was abusive.  The emphasis on discretion in 
Kirtsaeng is consistent with Supreme Court’s emphasis on discretion in Octane Fitness and Highmark.  
 40 JOYCE ET AL., supra note 7, at 946–47.  
 41 The factors also include the degree of success on the claim along with frivolousness, 
motivation, objective unreasonableness and considerations of compensation and deterrence.  See, 
e.g., TufAmerica Inc. v. Michael Diamond, 2016 WL 1565606 (S.D.N.Y 2016) (holding that 
plaintiff’s claims were objectively unreasonable and clearly without merit); Gilbert v. New Line 
Productions, Inc., 2010 WL 5790688 (C.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded, 490 F. 
App’x 34 (9th Cir. 2012).  In determining the amount of the fee courts typically apply the lodestar 
approach which multiplies the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation by a 
reasonable hourly rate.  Andreas Becker, DRYE WIT, In Recent Decisions, New York and California 
District Courts Agree that Prevailing Defendants in Copyright Infringement Lawsuits Are Entitled to Their 
Attorney’s Fees (Mar. 15, 2016), http://www.dryewit.com/2016/03/in-recent-decisions-new-york-
and-california-agree-that-prevailing-defendants-in-copyright-infringement-lawsuits-are-entitled-to-
their-attorneys-fees/.  This blog cites Fogerty and also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) 
for the lodestar method of calculating fees.  See, e.g., Am. Bd. of Internal Med. v. Von Muller, 540 
Fed. App’x 103, 107–08 (3d Cir. 2013) (remanding for recalculation an award of attorney’s fees 
with the district court being told to lay out a quantitative basis in order to calculate the lodestar 
properly); Bell v. Lantz, 2016 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 30,948 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding the fee 
award justified but remanding for recalculation of the award based on rate of $250 per hour in 
engagement letter instead of $410 per hour as set by the court). 
 42 Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, 761 F.3d 789, 791 (7th Cir. 2014); Thoroughbred Software 
Int’l v. Dice Corp., 488 F.3d 352, 362 (6th Cir. 2007). 
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prevailing defendant’s request would be denied if the court found that the 
plaintiff’s suit was neither frivolous, objectively unreasonable, nor brought in 
bad faith; an award of fees was thus unnecessary to promote either 
compensation or deterrence.43  
The meaning of the Fogerty standard was clarified in 2016 when the Supreme 
Court decided Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons.44  The Second Circuit had rejected 
defendant Kirtsaeng’s request that Wiley pay his attorney’s fees after the 
Supreme Court ruled in his favor in 2013, saying that his domestic sales of low-
priced textbooks purchased in Asia were protected under the first sale 
doctrine.45  The court of appeals concluded that plaintiff Wiley’s unauthorized 
distribution claim against Kirtsaeng was neither frivolous, objectively 
unreasonable nor brought in bad faith because the Supreme Court had split 4 to 
4 on the applicability of the first sale doctrine to the unauthorized sale of 
imported goods just a few years earlier in Omega v. Costco.46  In short, Wiley’s 
position was objectively reasonable so no award of fees should be made.  
Petitioner Kirtsaeng contended that there was a split in the circuits on how 
Section 505 is interpreted that results in a venue advantage for losing plaintiffs 
in the Second Circuit compared to the Seventh, Ninth and the Eleventh 
Circuits; in essence, the outcome of fee award depends on where he was 
originally sued.47  For instance, prior to Kirtsaeng there was a strong presumption 
                                                                                                                  
 43 See, e.g., Guzman v. Hacienda Records and Recording Studio, 2015 WL 4612583 (S.D. Tex. 
2015); Pearson Educ., Inc. v. Liu, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182648, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(holding a claim not objectively unreasonable in light of the Kirtsaeng case).  Cf. Williams v. 
Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LA CV13-06004 (2016) (refusing to award the late Marvin Gaye’s 
family $3.5 million in attorney’s fees as the prevailing party plaintiff because, among other things, 
defendants’ defenses were objectively reasonable and meritorious, and the award of $5.3 million 
in actual damages and profits coupled with a 50% running royalty on revenue from defendants’ 
song Blurred Lines were sufficient to compensate the plaintiffs and deter future infringements).  
See also AIPLA Newsstand, Williams v. Bridgeport Music, by Loeb and Loeb, April 12, 2016.  
 44 136 S. Ct. 1979 (2016).  See generally Graham, supra note 10, at 1.  
 45 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013).  See 91 BNA PTCJ 794 (Jan. 22, 2016).  The Second Circuit decision 
is at 605 Fed. App’x 48 (2d Cir. 2015).  The first sale doctrine is codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). 
 46 The Second Circuit stated that the district court properly placed substantial weight on the 
reasonableness of Wiley’s position in this case.  It had pursued an objectively reasonable position. 
605 Fed. App’x at 49–50.  See also Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 
2008), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 131 S. Ct. 565 (2010) (holding that goods lawfully made 
overseas are not lawfully made under U.S. copyright laws, and therefore the first sale doctrine 
does not limit the importation right for such copies).  This interpretation of sections 602, 106(3) 
and 109(a) was overruled in the Kirtsaeng decision.  See generally CCH Copyright Law Reports No. 
460, at 1–2 (summarizing the district court and appellate court decisions).  
 47 Mannatt Phelps & Phillips, Be Reasonable: The Supreme Court Agrees to Review the Standard for 
Awarding Attorney’s Fees to a Prevailing Party in Copyright Infringement Suits, AIPLA NEWSSTAND, Apr. 
19, 2016. 
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in favor of awarding fees for a meritorious defense in the Seventh Circuit48 and 
in the Sixth Circuit the grant of fees under Section 505 was said to be routine—
the rule rather than the exception.49  In essence, he was contending that if Wiley 
had sued him in the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, his chances of recovering fees 
would have been better than having been sued in the Second Circuit.  In 
addition, Kirtsaeng asserted that courts should weigh whether or not the 
litigation resolved an important, close legal issue in a way that clarified copyright 
law; if so, an award of fees would be appropriate.50  
The Supreme Court held unanimously in Kirtsaeng that among the several 
Fogerty factors courts should consider in awarding attorney’s fees under Section 
505, they must give substantial weight to the objective reasonableness of the 
losing party’s position, but not dispositive weight.  It rejected the ‘close case’ 
factor pushed by Kirtsaeng, emphasized that all the circumstances of the case 
must be considered in light of the goals of the Copyright Act, and said that fees 
might be appropriate even though the losing party’s position was reasonable.51  
Without intimating that a different conclusion should be reached, the Court 
remanded the case for a new hearing on fees because the courts in the Second 
Circuit may have made ‘substantial weight’ given to the reasonableness of the 
plaintiff’s claim almost dispositive; i.e., if a court determined that the losing 
plaintiff’s claim was reasonable, then it followed that fees should not be 
shifted.52  On remand, the district court again denied the prevailing defendant’s 
request for attorneys’ fees, explaining that Wiley’s claim was objectively 
reasonable; a legitimate attempt to enforce its rights.53 
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons provides nationwide clarity as to the 
appropriate test for awarding attorney’s fees under Section 505 and it resolves 
the “interesting disagreement” and perceived “venue advantage” for losing 
plaintiffs in some circuits54 by eliminating the presumptions for, or against, fee 
                                                                                                                  
 48 Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, 761 F.3d 781, 791 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 49 Thoroughbred Software Int’l v. Dice Corp., 488 F.3d 352, 362 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 50 Graham, supra note 10, at 4; Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) No. 460 at 2-3.  
 51 AIPLA Newsletter, Copyright Attorney Fee Decisions May Depend on ‘Objective 
Reasonableness,’ June 17, 2016, discussing Kirtsaeng, 136 S. Ct. 1979; Graham, supra note 10, at 4; 
Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) No. 460 at 3 (also explaining that Kirtsaeng’s suggested approach was 
not as administrable as Wiley’s).   
 52 Kirtsaeng, 136 S. Ct. at 1983; Graham, supra note 10, at 4; Mazumdar, supra note 9; Copyright 
L. Rep. (CCH) No. 460 at 4 (the court was to give substantial weight to the reasonableness of 
Wiley’s litigating position and also account for other relevant factors).  
 53 AIPLA Newsstand, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, Jan. 9, 2017.  
 54 Petition for Certiorari at 30–31, Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1979 (No. 
15-375).  Graham, supra note 10, at 4.  At one point in the fall of 2015 the Supreme Court had 
four separate petitions asking it to review how lower courts exercised their discretion to award 
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shifting that had developed in different circuits.55  However, notwithstanding 
those differences, there was no disagreement among the circuits that an award 
of attorney’s fees is appropriate when the trial court found that the plaintiff’s 
infringement claim was frivolous, objectively unreasonable or brought in bad 
faith.56  In those situations, it might often be possible to justify awarding fees to 
the prevailing alleged infringer by turning to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.  
B.  FEE SHIFTING UNDER RULE 11 
Attorneys have an ethical obligation to the court to refrain from conduct 
that frustrates the aims of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Rule 1 states 
that “[t]hese rules . . . should be construed, administered, and employed by the 
court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination 
of every action and proceeding.”57  Rule 11 of the Federal Rules, which 
“governs attorneys’ ethical obligations associated with filing or pursuing a 
lawsuit,”58 reinforces this principle by imposing a general duty of candor and 
care on litigants and their attorneys by requiring certification of pleadings and 
other documents which are filed in a lawsuit.  It is a professionalism tool.59  It 
provides that “[e]very pleading, written motion, and other paper must be signed 
by at least one attorney of record in the attorney’s name.”60  The attorney is 
thereby certifying to the court “that to the best of the person’s knowledge, 
                                                                                                                  
attorney’s fees to the prevailing party under section 505.  Tony Dutra, Fourth Petition Filed on 
Copyright Case Fee Shifting, BLOOMBERG BNA PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. – DAILY 
EDITION (Oct. 15, 2015).  The question presented in Kirtsaeng’s petition was: “What is the 
appropriate standard for awarding attorney’s fees to a prevailing party under §505 of the 
Copyright Act?” Anandaskankar Mazumdar, Textbook Arbitrager Gets Second Trip to Supreme Court, 
91 BNA PTCJ 794 (Jan. 22, 2016).  The Supreme Court’s denial of a copyright owner’s petition 
for review of a decision requiring him to pay an alleged infringer’s attorney’s fees in Hunn v. Dan 
Wilson Homes, Inc., No. 15-431 (December 7, 2015) arguably signaled that the federal courts 
should be as willing to award fees to the prevailing party in copyright infringement cases as the 
Court held in Octane Fitness for the prevailing defendant in patent cases.  Tony Dutra, High Court 
Denies Copyright Case Fee Shifting Review, BLOOMBERG BNA PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. – 
DAILY EDITION (Dec. 7, 2015).  
 55 Graham, supra note 10, at 1 (stating “the decision could make copyright fee awards in the 
Second Circuit slightly easier to obtain, it may have the opposite impact in circuits such as the 
Fifth and Seventh, which employ a presumption in favor of fee shifting that losing parties must 
overcome”). 
 56 Cf. LEAFFER, supra note 24, at 469; JOYCE ET AL., supra note 7, at 946. 
 57 FED. R. CIV. P. 1; 1993 Advisory Committee Notes for Rule 11. 
 58 Gianfrancesco v. Laborers Intern. Union Local 594, 2013 WL 2296759, at *2 (D.N.J. 2013). 
 59 RICHARD FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 379 (3d ed. 2012). 
 60 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a). 
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information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the 
circumstances”61 that the document is not being presented for an improper 
purpose, that it has evidentiary support, and is warranted by existing law or a 
nonfrivolous argument for changing existing law.62  It imposes a “duty to look 
before leaping and may be seen as a litigation version of the familiar railroad 
admonition to ‘stop, look and listen.’ ”63  “[W]here it is patently clear that a 
claim has absolutely no chance of success under the existing precedents, and 
where no reasonable argument can be advanced to extend, modify or reverse 
the law as it stands,” the rule is violated.64 
Upon motion or sua sponte, courts may impose sanctions for violations of the 
rule’s obligations.65  The sanctions can include awarding the moving party its 
reasonable attorney’s fees resulting from the violation.66  The purposes of Rule 
11 sanctions include deterrence and compensation.67  An award of attorney’s 
fees under the rule is not fee shifting but “a means by which to return to the 
status quo the party which incurred legal expenses as a result of an action or 
                                                                                                                  
 61 Id. at 11(b). 
 62 See FREER, supra note 59, at 381 (discussing the obligations FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)).  These 
obligations apply with equal force to those defending claims.  FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2).  The 
Advisory Committee Notes accompanying the 1993 revisions state:  
Subdivisions (b) and (c).  These subdivisions restate the provisions requiring 
attorneys and pro se litigants to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the law and 
facts before signing pleadings, written motions, and other documents, and 
prescribing sanctions for violation of these obligations.  The revision in part 
expands the responsibilities of litigants to the court, while providing greater 
constraints and flexibility in dealing with infractions of the rule.  The rule 
continues to require litigants to “stop-and-think” before initially making legal or 
factual contentions.  It also, however, emphasizes the duty of candor by 
subjecting litigants to potential sanctions for insisting upon a position after it is 
no longer tenable and by generally providing protection against sanctions if they 
withdraw or correct contentions after a potential violation is called to their 
attention.  
 63 Gianfrancesco, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73668, at *6 (citing and quoting Lieb v. Topstone 
Indus., 788 F.2d 151, 157 (3d Cir. 1986)). 
 64 See Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding 
that the District Court erred in denying municipal defendant’s motion for fees incurred in 
defending a claim that was destined to fail and on remand the court was to impose appropriate 
sanctions against the appellant, their counsel, or both).  
 65 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1), (c)(3). 
 66 Id. at 11(c)(4). 
 67 See Azubuko v. MBNA Am. Bank, 396 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D. Mass. 2005); Cooter & Gell v. 
Hartmax Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 404 (1990) (stating that the rule’s goal is general and specific 
deterrence); cf. Hart, supra note 5, at 650 (“The primary purpose of Rule 11, however, remains 
deterrence, not compensation.”). 
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motion which ought never have been filed.”68  Nevertheless, it has been noted 
that “[a]part from the statutory provisions allowing for the shifting of litigation 
costs, a federal court may award attorney’s fees pursuant to its inherent 
equitable powers, or pursuant to the dictates of” Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.69 
Rule 11 has been revised several times since adoption in 193870 and the 
current version, largely unchanged after substantial amendments in 1993, states 
that “the court may impose an appropriate sanction”71 and authorizes the 
imposition of nonmonetary as well monetary sanctions “limited to what suffices 
to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly 
situated.”72  Sanctions are not intended to punish but to deter violations of the 
general duty of reasonable care imposed by the rule.73 
Motions for sanctions have to be made separately from other motions and 
must describe the specific conduct that allegedly violates the duties listed in 
11(b).74  The motion is to be served on the attorney, law firm or party alleged to 
have violated the rule, but it must not be filed with or presented to court until 
twenty-one days after service on the alleged violator.75  During this twenty-one 
day safe harbor period the alleged violator can withdraw or correct the 
challenged document, and if this happens sanctions will not be imposed.76  An 
                                                                                                                  
 68 Collins v. Walden, 834 F.2d 961, 966 (11th Cir. 1987).   
 69 Eastway Constr. Corp., 762 F.2d at 253. 
 70 The original version of Rule 11 from 1938 did little to prevent abuses in filing frivolous and 
sham pleadings so substantial revisions became effective in 1983.  The amendments added an 
affirmative requirement that an attorney investigate the bases of a pleading before filing.  The 
attorney had to certify that the pleading was well grounded in fact and warranted by existing law 
or a good faith argument for changing existing law, and that it was not interposed for any 
improper purpose.  If a pleading did not meet this standard, then the court was required to 
impose sanctions which ordinarily were to order the offender to pay the opposing party his or her 
expenses, including attorney’s fees.  GENE SHREVE & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 217 (3d ed. 2002).  However, these revisions generated a dramatic increase in 
satellite litigation over sanctions as well as criticism and discontent.  Id. at 217–18.  FREER, supra 
note 59, at 379 (there was a huge amount of satellite sanctions litigation due in large part to the 
required sanctions—it was a must/shall Rule); Hart, supra note 5, at 650. 
 71 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1) (emphasis added).  Among other important changes, the revised 
Rule abolished the mandatory sanctions which had generated much of the satellite litigation.  See 
also Hart, supra note 5, at 650. 
 72 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(4).  See also SHREVE & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 70, at 218–19 
(explaining generally the changes made by the 1993 revisions to Rule 11). 
 73 FREER, supra note 59, at 379, 382. 
 74 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2). 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id.; FREER, supra note 59, at 381.  Failure to comply with the technical requirements of the 
safe harbor provision, Rule 11(c)(2), such as service of a motion as opposed to a letter and 
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order imposing sanctions must describe the challenged conduct and explain the 
basis for the sanction.77  Monetary sanctions cannot be imposed against a 
represented party for violating the obligations in Rule 11(b)(2) that one’s legal 
contentions are warranted, but they can be imposed against the party’s firm or 
an individual attorney.78 
The U.S. Supreme Court has made several important statements about the 
interpretation and application of Rule 11 in copyright infringement suits.79  In 
Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment the trial court directed a verdict in favor 
of the defendants against allegations of forgery in a suit for willful copyright 
infringement and then, upon defendants’ motion, imposed a sanction of 
$100,000 against the plaintiff attorney’s firm because there was no basis in fact 
for the allegations, and there had been an insufficient pretrial investigation of 
the forgery allegation.80  The law firm moved for relief, arguing that the 
sanction should be imposed against the attorney who signed the pleading, not 
the firm.  The trial court agreed in part and split the sanction between the 
attorney and his firm and the Court of Appeals affirmed.81  The Supreme Court 
reversed but not because sanctions were inappropriate.82  Rather, it reversed 
because the version of Rule 11 in effect at that time stated that in the event of a 
violation “the court . . . shall impose upon the person who signed” the pleading 
an appropriate sanction.83  The Court said that this language and the rule’s other 
references to ‘the signer’ connoted an individual.84  Accordingly, the decision 
                                                                                                                  
adhering to the time limits, will ordinarily result in denial of the motion for sanctions.  Gal v. 
Viacom Int’l, 403 F. Supp. 2d 294, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).  
 77 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(6); see Gal, 403 F. Supp. at 309 (“It does not seem overly demanding to 
require counsel to comply with the clear directives of Rule 11 when seeking sanctions.”).  
 78 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(5)(A) states that “[t]he court must not impose a monetary sanction: (A) 
against a represented party for violating Rule 11(b)(2).”  Rule 11 does not apply to discovery, FED. R. 
CIV. P. 11(b)(3), and courts retain inherent power to discipline attorneys and parties even though 
Rule 11 usually supersedes these inherent powers in situations where the rule applies.  SHREVE & 
RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 70, at 226 (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 42 (1991)). 
 79 Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Comms’ns. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533 (1991); Pavelic & 
LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., 493 U.S. 120 (1989). 
 80 Pavelic & LeFlore, 493 U.S. at 122.  See also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 11, at 12–178. 
 81 Pavelic & LeFlore, 498 U.S. at 122–23.  The attorney who signed the documents, Ray LeFlore, 
joined Radovan Pavelic in a law partnership well after the action had been commenced.  Id. at 122.  
 82 Id. at 124. 
 83 Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (emphasis added)).  
 84 Id.  The Court later added that the Rule is aimed “not [at] reimbursement but ‘sanction’, and 
that the purpose of Rule 11 as a whole is to bring home to the individual signer his personal, non-
delegable responsibility.”  Id. at 126.  See also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 11, at 12–178. 
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was reversed insofar as it allowed the attorney’s fees to be imposed against the 
offending lawyer’s firm.85  
The 1993 revisions to Rule 11 eliminated the ‘individual signer’ restriction.86  
The current version provides that “[a]bsent exceptional circumstances, a law 
firm must be held jointly responsible for a violation committed by its partner, 
associate, or employee.”87  Incidentally, there was no discussion in Pavelic & 
LeFlore of whether the defendant had sought an award of attorney’s fees against 
the plaintiff under Section 505 of the Copyright Act in addition to seeking 
sanctions against plaintiff’s counsel.  After all, the plaintiff lost the forgery claim 
on a directed verdict motion, the jury returned a verdict against it on all other 
counts, and the court said that there was no basis in fact for the allegations.88  
The defendant was a prevailing party, and an award of its attorney’s fees under 
Section 505 might have deterred the assertion of this kind of frivolous, 
unsupported, and objectively unreasonable claim by copyright holders just as 
effectively as the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions deters the filing of frivolous 
claims.  Nevertheless, the Rule 11 sanctions imposed in this pre-Fogerty decision 
sent a strong message to plaintiff’s counsel.89  
The Supreme Court made additional pronouncements on Rule 11 in the 
context of a copyright infringement claim in Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic 
Communications Enterprises, Inc.90 which affirmed the award of attorney’s fees under 
Rule 11 against the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s law firm for filing an infringement 
action based on alleged common errors in the parties’ respective works that were 
really correct information.91  The district court conducted its own investigation 
into the alleged copying, and determined that almost all the ‘seeds’ in defendant’s 
directory alleged to be false were in fact accurate.92  The court then referred the 
matter to a Magistrate to determine whether Rule 11 sanctions should be 
                                                                                                                  
 85 Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 127 (1989).  
 86 The Advisory Committee Notes for the 1993 revisions state that the new “provision is 
designed to remove the restrictions of the former rule.”  Cf. id. at 120 (stating that the 1983 
version of Rule 11 does not permit sanctions against law firm of attorney signing groundless 
complaint).  
 87 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1). 
 88 Pavelic & LeFlore, 493 U.S. at 122.  
 89 Of course, Pavelic & LeFlore was decided in 1989, four years before the Supreme Court 
decided Fogerty which put prevailing defendants in copyright infringement actions on equal 
footing with prevailing plaintiffs for purposes of awarding attorney’s fees to the prevailing party 
pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 505.  See supra notes 27–39 and accompanying text. 
 90 498 U.S. 533 (1991).  
 91 Id. at 537; NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 11, at 12-179. 
 92 Bus. Guides, Inc., 498 U.S. at 536.  The trial court had a law clerk spend about an hour calling 
the businesses in the ten the plaintiff had listed as the seeds which showed up in the defendant’s 
directory.  Nine of the ten did not contain false information.  
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imposed.  This judge asked the plaintiff and its law firm to explain why nine of 
the ten allegations of copying were meritless, expressed doubt that it was mere 
coincidence, and recommended that both the law firm and the party be 
sanctioned.93  Chromatic, the defendant, filed a motion for sanctions at the 
court’s request but soon withdrew it as to the law firm because it had dissolved.  
The court accepted this withdrawal and, after stating that the entire suit had no 
basis in fact and that there was no evidence of infringement, dismissed the case 
with prejudice.94  It imposed $13,865.66 in sanctions against plaintiff Business 
Guides.95  The Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court affirmed.  
The Supreme Court held that Rule 11  
imposes on any party who signs a pleading, motion or other 
paper—whether the party’s signature is required by the Rule or is 
provided voluntarily—an affirmative duty to conduct a 
reasonable inquiry into the facts and the law before filing, and 
that the applicable standard is one of reasonableness under the 
circumstances.96 
The Rule “imposes an objective standard of reasonable inquiry on represented 
parties who sign papers or pleadings,”97 and the trial court had found that the 
plaintiff had not conducted a reasonable inquiry before submitting the initial 
TRO application and before submitting certain signed declarations.98  
Here, as in the Supreme Court’s Pavelic & LeFlore decision, there was no 
discussion of whether the prevailing defendant sought attorney’s fees under 
Section 505 of the Copyright Act against the plaintiff.99  The alleged infringer 
was the prevailing party and the plaintiff’s claim was without merit and 
objectively unreasonable.  Accordingly, an award of fees under Section 505 
could have been justified.  Such an award would have compensated the 
defendant and also served as a deterrent.  Of course, an award of fees under the 
Copyright Act would have been duplicative of the sanctions imposed under 
                                                                                                                  
 93 Id. at 539.  The District Court judge agreed with the Magistrate and asked Chromatic, the 
defendant, to file a motion seeking sanctions. 
 94 Id.  The law firm was Finley Kumble.  The court’s rulings were without prejudice to the 
defendant’s right to pursue sanctions against the firm at a later date. Id.  
 95 Id. at 540 (the amount of Chromatic’s legal expenses and out of pocket costs). 
 96 Id. at 551. 
 97 Id. at 554. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. at 551–54 (explaining why Rule 11 was valid under the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2072). 
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Rule 11.100  Nevertheless, under either rationale the fee award would have had 
the effect of deterring this kind of frivolous, unsupported claim.  In summary, 
the kind of litigation misconduct that might result in an award of attorneys’ fees 
as a sanction under Rule 11 could also justify fee shifting to the prevailing party 
under Section 505 of the Copyright Act. 
C.  FEE SHIFTING UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1927 OR INHERENT AUTHORITY 
The current version of 28 U.S.C. § 1927 derives from an 1813 statute, and 
has provided for the award of attorney’s fees since 1980.101  It states:  
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any 
court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so 
multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and 
vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the 
excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred 
because of such conduct.  
Section 1927 is described as a penal statute that deters unnecessary delays in 
litigation by requiring attorneys who violate it to personally satisfy costs 
associated with their litigation misconduct including attorney’s fees.102  While 
Rule 11 focuses on pleadings, motions, and other signed papers, Section 1927 
looks at the course of conduct.103  Sanctions are triggered under this statute if 
the accused attorney multiplies the proceedings and the attorney’s actions are 
both vexatious and unreasonable, or if he or she acted in bad faith.104  It should 
be used only when the misconduct evidences a serious “ ‘disregard for the 
orderly process of justice.’ ”105  An attorney who knows or, should know, that a 
                                                                                                                  
 100 Business Guides was also decided before the Supreme Court’s decision in Fogerty that put 
prevailing defendants on equal footing with prevailing plaintiffs in regard to the award of fees 
under section 505.  
 101 GREGORY JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE § 20, at 374–75 
(3d ed. 2000); Janet Eve Josselyn, The Song of Sirens – Sanctioning Lawyers Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, 31 
B.C. L. REV. 477, 477–78 (1990). 
 102 JOSEPH, supra note 101, at 374–75; see also Hart, supra note 5, at 651–52 (explaining a court 
may hold parties and counsel joint and severally liable for fees under section 1927); see also Royal 
Oak Entertainment v. City of Royal Oak, 486 F. Supp. 2d 675, 679 (E.D. Mich. 2007).  
 103 Hart, supra note 5, at 652 (citing Bowler v. U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 901 F. 
Supp. 597, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)). 
 104 Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of America, 768 F.2d 1159, 1165 (10th Cir. 1985). 
 105 Id. (explaining awards under section 1927 will not be set aside unless the court’s “findings 
are clearly erroneous”) (quoting Kiefel v. Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc., 404 F.2d 1163, 1167 (7th Cir. 
1968) (cert. denied)). 
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claim is frivolous, or that his or her tactics will block litigation of legitimate 
claims, may be subject to sanctions under Section 1927.106  However, filing an 
objectively unreasonable copyright infringement claim that might result in an 
award of fees under Section 505 will not necessarily mean that the claim is so 
completely without merit to require the conclusion that it was filed for an 
improper purpose under Section 1927.107  
Section 1927 could be used in a copyright infringement suit when an award 
of fees to the prevailing party under Section 505 might not be appropriate but 
the court still determines it is necessary to sanction particular misconduct by 
counsel.108  A court might turn to Section 1927 when it does not want to visit 
the misconduct sins of an attorney on his or her client—when the client’s only 
fault is making a poor choice in counsel.109  For example, in Baiul v. NBC Sports 
the court granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings and for sanctions 
under Section 1927 against plaintiff’s counsel who had represented a former 
Olympic skater in a lengthy series of frivolous actions.110  The defendant 
requested sanctions against the attorney, arguing successfully that they were 
warranted because he maintained the action for years after it became clear that 
the allegations were meritless and contained deficiencies that precluded his 
client’s entitlement to relief.  The court made detailed findings of fact showing 
with clear and convincing evidence that the lawyer’s conduct of the litigation 
was in bad faith and made for an improper purpose.111 
More types of misconduct can be sanctioned under Section 1927 than under 
Rule 11 but there is some overlap.  Filing baseless or deceptive pleadings, 
baseless opposition papers, or pursuing a position after it is apparent that the 
position is devoid of merit and frivolous can fit under Rule 11 and also under 
                                                                                                                  
 106 Fharmacy Records v. Nassar, 572 F. Supp. 2d 869, 879 (E.D. Mich. 2008). 
 107 In re 60 E. 80th St. Equities, 218 F.3d 109, 115 (2d Cir. 2000); 16 Casa Duse v. Merkin, 791 
F.3d 247, 264 (2d Cir. 2015).  
 108 See Malibu Media, LLC v. Pelizzo, Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 30,743 (11th Cir. 2015) 
(finding no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial fees under Section 505 because 
plaintiff had acted in an objectively reasonable manner up to a point, and affirming order 
requiring plaintiff’s counsel to pay vexatious litigation fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 after an 
admittedly ‘knee-jerk’ e-mail promising to continue the case against plaintiff). 
 109 Atkins v. Fischer, 232 F.R.D. 116, 128 (D.D.C. 2005). 
 110 2016 BL 123918 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (BNA). 
 111 Id. (explain that the fee award was ultimately reduced, in part due to the plaintiff’s attorney’s 
limited financial resources); Baiul v. NBC Sports, 2016 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 30,931 
(S.D.N.Y. 2016); see also Lightspeed Media Corp. v. Smith et al., 2016 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 
¶ 30,960 (7th Cir. 2016) (imposing substantial sanctions on attorneys operating a “porno-trolling 
collective” under Section 1927 and discovery rules for filing frivolous, baseless and bullying 
claims, and for obstructing discovery). 
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Section 1927.112  Such misconduct could also lead to an award of attorney’s fees 
under 17 U.S.C. § 505,113 but it might not fall within a court’s inherent power to 
impose sanctions because this authority can be invoked only for abusive 
litigation practices done fraudulently or in bad faith.114  A court can rely on its 
inherent equitable powers to award fees to the prevailing party “only where the 
unsuccessful litigant has been found to have ‘acted in bad faith, vexatiously, 
wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.’ ”115  Thus, a court’s inherent authority to 
sanction is narrower than its authority to impose sanctions under Rule 11 or 
Section 1927.116  
In order for a court to impose sanctions under its inherent equitable powers 
there must be clear and convincing evidence that the claim is “ ‘entirely without 
color and made for reasons of harassment or delay or for other improper 
purposes.’ ”117  For instance, in Scholastic, Inc. v. Stouffer the court relied on its 
inherent authority to award $50,000 in attorney’s fees as a sanction after 
dismissing defendant Stouffer’s counterclaim.  It found that she had produced 
at least seven pieces of falsified evidence as well as falsified testimony, and that 
she had failed to correct her fraudulent submissions when confronted with 
evidence that undermined the validity of those submissions.118  The court made 
detailed findings with respect to each incidence of falsified evidence.119  The 
degree of misconduct needed to justify imposing sanctions under a court’s 
inherent power is underscored by the statement that a party’s fraud on the court 
must be established by clear and convincing evidence that the party “sentiently 
                                                                                                                  
 112 Hart, supra note 5, at 653.  See, e.g., Kramer v. Tribe, 156 F.R.D. 96, 111 (D.N.J. 1994) 
(imposing sanctions on the plaintiff—former trial counsel—in a motion for sanctions brought 
before the court pursuant to Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the court’s inherent disciplinary 
authority); cf. Riley v. Philadelphia, 136 F.R.D. 571, 574 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (attorney’s fees to be paid 
by counsel for filing a frivolous action and not dismissing the claim in a timely fashion were 
awarded pursuant to Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927). 
 113 Burger-Moss v. Steinman, 127 F.R.D. 452, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. 
Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 236–64 (2d Cir. 2015); Fharmacy Records v. Nassar, 572 F. Supp. 2d 869, 
880–81 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (fees awarded to the defendant under sections 1927 and 505 with the 
court leaving it to the Magistrate Judge to allocate the total award between the losing counsel and 
his client). 
 114 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45–46 (1991). 
 115 Eastway Constr. Corp. v. New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253 (2d Cir. 1985) citing and quoting from 
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc., 421 U.S. 240, 258–59 (1975). 
 116 JOSEPH, supra note 101, § 26A1, at 427.  
 117 Id. citing and quoting from Browning Debenture Holders’ Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078, 
1088 (2d Cir. 1977); Schlaifer Nance & Co. v. Estate of Warhol, 194 F.3d 323, 336 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 118 221 F. Supp. 2d 425, 439, 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 119 Id. at 440–44.  
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set in motion some unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with the 
judicial system’s ability impartially to adjudicate” the action.120 
III.  SIMILARITIES BETWEEN AWARDS UNDER SECTION 505, RULE 11 AND 
SECTION 1927 
A.  FEES UNDER 17 U.S.C. § 505    
There are many post-Fogerty copyright infringement decisions discussing the 
award of attorney’s fees under 17 U.S.C. § 505 to prevailing defendants121 and, 
as noted earlier,122 the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley 
& Sons provides nationwide clarity as to the appropriate test for awarding fees 
under Section 505.123  It resolved the “interesting disagreement” and perceived 
“venue advantage” for losing plaintiffs in some circuits124 by eliminating the 
presumptions for or against fee shifting that had developed in different 
circuits.125  However, there was no disagreement prior to the Kirtsaeng ruling that 
an award of attorney’s fees was appropriate when the trial court determined that 
the plaintiff’s infringement claim was frivolous, objectively unreasonable or 
brought in bad faith, both in the legal and factual components of the case.126  
Such litigation conduct could also justify an award of fees under Rule 11.127   
InDyne, Inc. v. Abacus Technology Corp., involved a claim against Abacus 
Technology for allegedly infringing software code used during a contract with 
                                                                                                                  
 120 Id. at 439 citing and quoting from Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1118 (1st Cir. 
1989); Mahan v. Roc Nation, LLC, 2016 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 30,986 at 48,951–52 
(S.D.N.Y. 2016) (referring to assess fees against losing plaintiff’s counsel because he had not 
acted in bad faith).  
 121 See generally NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 11, § 14.10[D][3][b] at 14-230 to 14-243; Robert 
Rossi, 1 Attorneys’ Fees § 10.42 (Copyright Actions) (3d ed. 2015). 
 122 See supra notes 40–54 and accompanying text.  
 123 Graham, supra note 10, at 4.  
 124 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 30,371 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(docket number 15-375, cert filed September 24, 2015).  The question presented in Kirtsaeng’s 
petition was: What is the appropriate standard for awarding attorney’s fees to a prevailing party 
under § 505 of the Copyright Act? Anandaskankar Mazumdar, Textbook Arbitrager Gets Second Trip 
to Supreme Court, PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA), Jan. 22, 2016, at 794.  
 125 Graham, supra note 10, at 1 (“[T]he decision could make copyright fee awards in the Second 
Circuit slightly easier to obtain, it may have the opposite impact in circuits such as the Fifth and 
Seventh, which employ a presumption in favor of fee shifting that losing parties must 
overcome.”). 
 126 See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 7, at 946; LEAFFER, supra note 24, at 469.  
 127 See supra notes 78–100 and accompanying text.  
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NASA.128  The court granted summary judgement for defendant Abacus 
because InDyne could not produce a copy of the software that had been 
allegedly infringed.  Accordingly, it was impossible for InDyne to prove 
substantial similarity.  This judgement was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.129  
The defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees was granted because it was 
objectively unreasonable for the plaintiff to sue without evidence of their 
software code in order to prove substantial similarity, the court found that 
plaintiff’s motives were questionable, and said that other copyright holders 
without evidence of software code should be deterred from filing similar 
suits.130  In short, the plaintiff’s claim was objectively unreasonable, its motive 
was dubious, and the court recognized a need to deter similar claims.131  Under 
these circumstances, it might have been possible to justify fee shifting under 
Rule 11.132 
The developers of the very popular World of Warcraft computer game were 
awarded attorney’s fees under section 505 after a former employee’s copyright 
infringement suit was dismissed on summary judgment.133  The plaintiff had 
been a game master for the defendant who also performed voiceover work at 
the game developer’s invitation.  She believed her voice was being used solely 
for promotional videos but after leaving the company she learned that her 
voiceovers were also used in the games.  The court concluded that she had no 
copyright interest in the voiceovers because content creation was one of her 
duties as spelled out in the employment manual so this made the voiceovers 
                                                                                                                  
 128 No. 6:11VC137Orl-22DAB, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23582 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 25, 2014), aff’d, 
No. 14-11058, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 18266 (11th Cir. Sept. 24, 2014) (trial court did not abuse 
discretion when it ruled that plaintiff’s decision to sue without proof of an element of its prima 
facie case was objectively unreasonable). 
 129 Id.  
 130 Id. at 555.  See also Mahan v. Roc Nation, LLC, 2015 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 30,797 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (entitling Rapper Jay Z to $250,000 in fees against a plaintiff whose claims were 
clearly time-barred and thus objectively unreasonable); Medallion Home Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Tivoli 
Homes of Sarasota, Inc., 2016 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 30,999 (M.D. Fla. 2016) (award of fees 
justified because plaintiff’s architectural copyright infringement claims were objectively 
unreasonable).  
 131 See also Choyce v. SF Bay Area Indep. Media Ctr., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155438 (N.D. Cal. 
2014) (fees awarded to prevailing defendant after plaintiff’s claim was dismissed with prejudice 
under Rule 12(b)(6) as being objectively baseless, failing to take steps to ensure he had a valid 
claim, and then making additional meritless arguments); Murphy v. Lazarev, 2016 Copyright L. 
Dec. (CCH) ¶ 30,951 (6th Cir. 2010) (entitling defendant pop singer to fees and costs because 
infringement claims were frivolous and unreasonable). 
 132 Cf. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’ns Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 533 (1991).  
See also supra notes 90–100 and accompanying text.  
 133 Lewis v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., No. C12-1096-CW 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135889, at *10 
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2014).  
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work-for-hire.134  In ruling on the defendant developer’s fee request the court 
concluded that the employee’s suit was “objectively unreasonable and bordered 
on frivolous” and her motivation was questionable.135  It said that “deterring 
such meritless claims supports the objective of the Copyright Act.”136  Here 
again, there was a frivolous claim, a bad motive and the need to deter similar 
meritless claims.137  It may have been appropriate to support the award of fees 
under Rule 11.138  
In 2011 Perfect 10, the operator of an adult website, sued Giganews, Inc. for 
infringement alleging that Giganews users had posted Perfect 10’s images in 
messages on the Giganews usenet service.139  Perfect 10 ultimately lost and the 
court ordered it to pay Giganews more than $5.2 million in attorney’s fees 
under Section 505 even though the company’s suit was deemed not frivolous 
when filed because it “involve[ed] difficult and somewhat novel questions of 
law.”140  However, this determination did not prevent the court from saying an 
award of attorney’s fees was appropriate to promote the purposes of the 
                                                                                                                  
 134 Id. at *6. 
 135 She made a $1.2 million settlement demand and did not respond to the developer’s 
settlement offer of $15,000.  The court granted $152,104 in fees but reduced the award to $15,000 
due to the employee’s financial situation. Id.  See also City of Inglewood v. Teixeira, No. 2:15-cv-
01815 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (holding city’s infringement claim against defendant’s posting of videos of 
council meetings on YouTube was objectively unreasonable, the city was suing to stifle his 
criticism of council, and awarding fees furthered the purposes of the act).  
 136 Lewis v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., No. C12-1096-CW, 2014 U.S. Distilled, LEXIS 135889, at 
*8.  Blizzard was awarded $13,757 for prevailing on plaintiff’s right of publicity claim, and 
$15,000 for prevailing on the copyright claim. Id. at *15.  See also Savant Homes, Inc. v. Douglas 
Consulting LLC, 2015 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 30,811 (D. Colo. 2015) (stating that although 
plaintiff’s infringement theory might not have been frivolous or objectively unreasonable, the case 
warranted an award of fees for equitable reasons in that the plaintiff promoted no public good by 
suing over allegedly infringing custom homes and imposed substantial expenses on the 
defendants which were far in excess of damages it could have recovered).  
 137 See also Conrad v. AM Cmty. Credit Union, 750 F.3d 634, 637–38 (7th Cir. 2014) (affirming 
dismissal of plaintiff’s suit as being without merit, noting her abuse of process by filing multiple 
frivolous suits and being ordered to pay attorney’s fees, and suggesting that she should be 
enjoined from suing again until she pays her debts); cf. Elfie Film, LLC. v. Gregory Murphy, 2015 
Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 30,834 (2d Cir. 2015) (awarding fees in unsuccessful defense in a 
declaratory judgment action).  
 138 Cf. Pavelic & Leflore v. Marvel Entm’t Group, 493 U.S. 120 (1989).  See also supra notes 79–
89 and accompanying text.  
 139 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., No. CV-11-07098-AB, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54063, at 
*4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2015). 
 140 Id. The court noted that Perfect 10’s suit was like its 2005 claims against Google and 
Amazon.com which it lost after the Ninth Circuit held that thumbnail images of Perfect 10 
photos were transformative and thus protected as a fair use.  
23
Shipley: Discouraging Frivolous Copyright Infringement Claims: Fee Shiftin
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2016
56 J. INTELL. PROP. L.  [Vol. 24:33 
 
Copyright Act141 because “there [was] ample evidence . . . that Perfect 10 
pursued this litigation for reasons inconsistent with the purpose of the 
Copyright Act, and this factor weighs in favor of an award of attorney’s fees.”142  
It likened Perfect 10 to a copyright troll that was in the business of litigation, 
not protecting its copyrights.143 
The Kirtsaeng decision should not alter the outcome of this ruling and similar 
cases because the Supreme Court made clear that a “court could award fees 
even though the losing party presented reasonable arguments, or it could deny 
fees even though the losing party made unreasonable arguments.”144  Either 
way, perhaps the conduct of Perfect 10’s attorneys in litigation against Giga 
News also violated their obligations under Rule 11(b)(1); by signing they 
certified to the court “that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, 
and belief” that pleadings, motions or other papers are “not being presented for 
any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly 
increase the cost of litigation.”145  
A frivolous claim inconsistent with the purposes of the Copyright Act and 
the need for deterrence came together to justify an award of attorney’s fees 
against the Estate of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle for its unsuccessful effort to 
                                                                                                                  
 141 Id. at *8–9.  
 142 Id. at *31. 
 143 Id. See also Omega SA v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 776 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2015) (awarding 
fees against Omega’s unsuccessful effort to control sale of its watches via copyright upheld 
because it would further the purposes of the Copyright Act); Hunn v. Dan Wilson Homes, 2015 
Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 30,777 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that lower court did not abuse its 
discretion in awarding attorney’s fees to defendants who prevailed on an implied license theory 
even though it did not explicitly state that the award promoted the purposes of the Copyright 
Act), certiorari denied, No. 15-431 (Dec. 7, 2015), reported in PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 
(BNA) – DAILY EDITION (12/7/15); Humphreys & Partners Architects, L.P. v. Lessard Design 
Inc., 2015 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 30,848 (E.D. Va. 2015) (providing same outcome in an 
architectural copyright infringement action between competitors even though the plaintiff’s 
positions were not objectively unreasonable but based on plausible theories—the prevailing 
defendant was entitled to an award of fees because there was evidence that the plaintiff filed the 
suit to force a settlement rather than to protect its copyright, and to pursue an unusually large 
damages claim); Assessment Technologies of WI, LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 361 F.3d 434, 437 (7th 
Cir. 2004) (Seventh Circuit awarded attorney’s fees against a plaintiff whose suit was marginal, but 
not frivolous because the plaintiff’s claim attempted to improperly annex a portion of the public 
domain and the court said an award of fees was appropriate because the plaintiff was using its 
infringement suit “to obtain property protection, here in data, that copyright clearly does not 
confer, hoping to force a settlement or even achieve an outright victory over an opponent that 
may lack the resources or the legal sophistication to resist effectively”).  
 144 High Court Vacates, Remands Denial of Fees to Textbook Seller, 459 Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) at 1 
(June 21, 2016). 
 145 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1). 
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extend the life of Sherlock Holmes’ copyright to 135 years.  Starting in 1887, 
Doyle published fifty-six stories and four novels with the great detective 
Sherlock Holmes as the central character.  His final ten Holmes stories, 
published between 1923 and 1927, are still protected by copyright and will be 
joining all his pre-1923 works in the public domain between 2018 and 2022.146  
After being told by the Doyle estate to pay a $5,000 license fee in order to put 
together an anthology of stories by current authors using Holmes, Dr. Watson 
and other characters from Doyle’s public domain works, Leslie Klinger sought a 
declaratory judgment that he was free to use all the materials from those public 
domain works.147  The trial court eventually issued the declaratory judgment for 
Klinger and the estate appealed.148  Judge Posner, writing for the Court of 
Appeals,149 responded to the estate’s contention that copyright on a complex 
character like Sherlock Holmes does not enter the public domain until the 
copyright on the final story expires150 by saying that there was no basis “in 
statute or case law for extending a copyright beyond its expiration.  When a 
story falls into the public domain, story elements—including characters covered 
by the expired copyright—become fair game for follow on authors, . . . .”151  He 
stated that the estate “suggested no legal grounds for extending copyright 
                                                                                                                  
 146 Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, 755 F.3d 496, 497 (7th Cir. 2014).  
 147 Id. at 497–98; id. at 500 (citing Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 870 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1989)); id. at 503.  
Klinger and his co-editor entered into negotiations with a publisher when the estate insisted on 
the license.  There also was a threat by the estate to sue for infringement.  Klinger’s action 
acknowledged that he could not use those aspects of the post-1923 works which were still 
protected by copyright.  There was no serious contention that Holmes, Watson and other well 
developed characters in this series of works were not entitled to copyright protection to begin 
with.  Rather the issue was what happens to the many of those characters’ traits as the works start 
entering the public domain with the expiration of their copyrights.  The court noted that a 
decision in the Second Circuit involving the fictional Amos and Andy characters was very similar 
to this case.  
 148 Id. at 498.  The Doyle estate defaulted and the court gave Klinger leave to file a motion for 
summary judgment.  The estate responded to this motion with some novel arguments about 
enlarging copyright protection.  
 149 Judge Posner first had to deal with the estate’s argument that there was no subject matter 
jurisdiction.  It contended unsuccessfully that there was no case or controversy between the 
parties, and that Klinger’s suit was not ripe. Id. at 498–500. 
 150 Id. at 498, 500.  The estate also contended that even though many Holmes stories were in 
the public domain it was still wrong to permit the use of these not yet fully developed characters 
even though the stories could be used. Id. at 498. 
 151 Id. at 500 (citing Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 870 F.2d 40, 49–51 (2d Cir. 1989) as a case similar 
to Klinger’s action against the Doyle estate).  
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protection beyond the limits fixed by Congress” and that the “appeal borders 
on the quixotic.”152  
This victory was followed by Klinger’s request that the Conan Doyle estate 
reimburse the attorney’s fees he incurred on the appeal153 pursuant to Section 
505 of the Copyright Act.154  Judge Posner noted that the Seventh Circuit had 
stated previously that as “a consequence of a successful defense of an 
infringement suit the defendant is entitled to a ‘very strong’ presumption in 
favor of receiving attorney’s fees in order to ensure that an infringement 
defendant does not abandon a meritorious defense in situations in which ‘the 
cost of vindication exceeds the private benefit to the party.”155  He explained 
that in this case it did not matter that the alleged infringer was the plaintiff 
because “a declaratory-judgment plaintiff in a copyright case is in effect a 
defendant permitted to precipitate the infringement suit.”156  Judge Posner then 
turned to the estate’s business plan of charging a modest license fee for which 
there was no legal basis, and said that this worked until Klinger resisted, 
becoming a private attorney general to combat “a disreputable business 
practice—a form of extortion—and he is seeking by the present motion not to 
obtain a reward but merely to avoid a loss.”157  Here again, there is a reasonable 
                                                                                                                  
 152 Id. at 503.  The court added that perpetual copyright would violate the copyright clause of 
the constitution.  The Supreme Court later denied the estate’s petition for a writ of certiorari.  
Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 30,619 (Nov. 13, 2014). 
 153 It is the trial courts which ordinarily award attorney’s fees in copyright infringement cases, 
but it is settled that fees can also be awarded for services rendered on an appeal.  NIMMER & 
NIMMER, supra note 11, § 12.10[E] at 14-243. 
 154 Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, 761 F.3d 789, 790–91 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting 17 U.S.C. 
§ 505).  Those fees totaled $30,679.93 and Klinger filed a separate petition with the district court 
for his fees and related costs there tallying $39,123.44.  
 155 Id. at 791 (quoting Assessment Technologies of Wisconsin, LLC. v. WIREdata, Inc., 361 
F.3d 434, 437 (7th Cir. 2004)).  The Seventh Circuit, per Posner, stated in WIREdata that:  
[w]hen the prevailing party is the defendant, who by definition receives not a 
small award but no award, the presumption in favor of awarding fees is very 
strong. . . .  For without the prospect of such an award, the party might be 
forced into a nuisance settlement or deterred altogether from exercising his 
rights. 
361 F.3d at 437.  The Seventh Circuit’s presumption is now likely inappropriate following the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Kirtsaeng.  See supra notes 43–56 and accompanying text.  
 156 761 F.3d at 792.  
 157 Id. He concluded by saying it was time for the estate to change its business model and 
ordered it to pay Klinger’s fees.  The court also discussed the serious problems the estate faced in 
asking booksellers to cooperate with it in enforcing its nonexistent copyright claims against 
Klinger—joining in the boycott of one of the estate’s competitors.  This raised serious antitrust 
issues.  The estate petitioned for an emergency stay of the Seventh Circuit’s ruling which was 
denied by Justice Kagan.  Allisa Wickham, LAW360, July 19, 2014. 
26
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol24/iss1/4
2016] DISCOURAGING FRIVOLOUS COPYRIGHT CLAIMS  59 
 
argument that the attorney for the Conan Doyle estate violated Rule 11(b)(2) by 
asserting expired copyrights in the many Sherlock Holmes stories and 
characters which had entered the public domain.158   
Notwithstanding Judge Posner’s statement in the Conan Doyle estate 
litigation about victorious defendants being entitled to a strong presumption in 
favor of receiving fees,159 awards of attorney’s fees to prevailing defendants in 
copyright infringement actions were never supposed to be automatic.160  
Section 505 is a may-also-award provision.  The Supreme Court made this point 
in Fogerty by rejecting the defendant’s argument for adoption of the British 
rule,161 and it was re-emphasized in the Court’s recent decision in Kirtsaeng v. 
John Wiley & Sons.162  There the Court underscored the district court’s discretion 
in making fee awards, and made clear that although substantial weight should be 
given to the question of whether the losing side had a reasonable case to fight, 
all the other factors listed in Fogerty should be taken into account beyond the 
reasonableness of litigating positions.163  It is no longer appropriate to make 
presumptions about fee awards under Section 505.164  However, this does not 
mean that the Klinger fee ruling would come out differently post-Kirtsaeng 
without the Seventh Circuit’s presumption because the Court of Appeals 
concluded that the Doyle estate’s infringement claim was unreasonable and 
                                                                                                                  
 158 Under FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2), an attorney who files a pleading or other written document 
certifies that the “claims . . . and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a 
nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new 
law.” 
 159 761 F.3d at 791.  Cf. Marshall & Swift/Boeckh, LLC. v. Dewberry & Davis, LLC, 586 Fed. 
App’x 448 (9th Cir. 2014) (stating the trial court did not err when it declined to apply the 
presumption that prevailing defendant is entitled to fees).  
 160 See, e.g., Seltzer v. Green Day, 725 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2013) (vacating award of fees to 
successful defendants in part because there was no reason for the plaintiff to have known at the 
outset that his chances of success were slim to none); ZilYen, Inc. v. Rubber Mfrs. Ass., 958 F. 
Supp. 2d 215 (D.D.C. 2013) (award of attorney’s fees to prevailing defendant who won on a 
motion to dismiss was not warranted); Am. Bd. of Internal Med. v. Von Muller, 540 Fed. App’x 
103 (3d Cir. 2013) (remanding award of attorney’s fees for redetermination); Reinicke v. Creative 
Empire, LLC., 38 F. Supp. 3d 1192 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (holding no fee award warranted because 
plaintiff’s claim was neither objectively unreasonable nor brought in bad faith); Zalewski v. T.P. 
Builders, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106 (N.D.N.Y. 2015) (awarding no fees because the 
problems with plaintiff’s pleadings were attributable more to counsel’s lack of talent than to any 
bad faith by the plaintiff); cf. Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., AIPLA NEWSSTAND, Apr. 12, 
2016 (district court denied request of Marvin Gaye’s family for $3.5 million in attorney’s fees 
following victory in the highly publicized “Blurred Lines” trial).  
 161 510 U.S. at 533–34.  See also supra notes 27–43 and accompanying text.  
 162 See supra notes 43–56 and accompanying text.  
 163 136 S. Ct. at 1982–83; Mazumdar, supra note 9.  
 164 Graham, supra note 10, at 1, 4.  
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frivolous.165  In contrast, the infringement claim by publisher John Wiley & 
Sons against the importer of the low-priced text books was neither frivolous, 
marginal, nor inconsistent with the purposes of copyright.166  The Doyle estate’s 
frivolous and unreasonable claim might trigger fee shifting under Rule 11 as 
well as under Section 505, but the John Wiley & Son’s claim against Kirtsaeng 
would not.  
B.  FEES UNDER RULE 11 
The losing parties and their attorneys in the copyright infringement actions 
summarized above, in which fees were awarded under Section 505, might have 
violated their obligations under Rule 11 as well.  When they presented their 
pleadings, motions, and other papers, each of these attorneys certified to the 
court “that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, 
formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances”167 that the 
document was not being presented for an improper purpose, that it had 
evidentiary support, and that it was warranted by existing law or a nonfrivolous 
argument for changing existing law.168  When a court granting a motion for fees 
under Section 505 concludes that a copyright infringement claim was 
objectively unreasonable and frivolous, and also questions the losing party’s 
motive, it often could also conclude that Rule 11 was violated.169  After all, 
“where it is patently clear that a claim has absolutely no chance of success under 
the existing precedents, and where no reasonable argument can be advanced to 
extend, modify or reverse the law as it stands,” Rule 11 is violated.170   
This is not to suggest that Rule 11 violations can be found every time a 
court awards fees under Section 505 to a prevailing alleged infringer.  In 
                                                                                                                  
 165 Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 761 F.3d 789, 792 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 166 Kirtsaeng, 136 S. Ct. at 1984; see also Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, No. CV15-3402 RGK 
(AGRx) (C.D. Cal. 2016) (district court judge declines to award $800,000 in fees to prevailing 
defendants in highly publicized Stairway to Heaven litigation because the plaintiff’s claim was 
objectively reasonable and properly motivated); Loeb & Loeb LLP, AIPLA NEWSSTAND (Aug. 8, 
2016); Dorsey & Whitney LLP, All That Glitters is Not Gold for Led Zeppelin’s Claim for Attorney’s 
Fees, AIPLA NEWSSTAND (Aug. 25, 2016); Bronstad, supra note 16. 
 167 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). 
 168 FREER, supra note 59, at 381 (discussing the obligations of FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).  These 
obligations apply with equal force to those defending claims.  FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(4)). 
 169 See the discussions of several cases at supra notes 128–66 in which the courts concluded that the 
claims were objectively unreasonable and frivolous and questioned the losing parties’ motives.  
 170 Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating “it 
was error for the district court to deny municipal defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees incurred 
in defending” a claim that was destined to fail and on remand the court was impose appropriate 
sanctions against the appellant, their counsel, or both).  
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jurisdictions where courts had said, pre-Kirtsaeng, that “a consequence of the 
successful defense of an infringement suit the defendant is entitled to a ‘very 
strong’ presumption in favor of receiving attorney’s fees, in order to ensure that 
an infringement defendant does not abandon a meritorious defense,”171 it 
would not be appropriate to conclude that the plaintiff violated Rule 11 by 
filing suit because simply losing does not mean the plaintiff’s suit was frivolous, 
meritless or without foundation.  In essence, this now discredited strong 
presumption of fee shifting meant that attorney’s fees might be awarded against 
a plaintiff whose claim was neither frivolous nor objectively unreasonable.  The 
same would have held true in those circuits in which it has been held that the 
award of fees under Section 505 of the Copyright Act was routine—the rule 
rather than the exception.172  As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Kirtsaeng seems to put an end to presumptions when courts exercise 
their discretion to award fees under Section 505 of the Copyright Act.173 
On the other hand, many of the courts which awarded attorney’s fees as a 
sanction for a Rule 11 violation in a copyright infringement case could have 
justified the fee shifting under Section 505 because the underlying claim was 
objectively unreasonable or frivolous.  Nevertheless, the courts relied on Rule 
11 instead of Section 505 so they could order the fees to be paid by the losing 
attorney rather than the losing party.  Section 505 has not been interpreted to 
permit the prevailing party’s fees to be paid by opposing counsel.174  For 
example, in Hays v. Sony Corporation of America sanctions were sought against 
opposing counsel under Rule 11 even though the defendant seemed to have a 
viable claim for fees under Section 505.175  The trial court, after dismissing the 
plaintiffs’ copyright infringement suit for failure to state a claim, awarded 
                                                                                                                  
 171 Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 761 F.3d at 791 (quoting Assessment Techs. of Wis., 
LLC. v. WIREdata, Inc., 361 F.3d 434, 437 (7th Cir. 2004)).  The Seventh Circuit, per Posner, 
stated in WIREdata that  
[w]hen the prevailing party is the defendant, who by definition receives not a 
small award but no award, the presumption in favor of awarding fees is very 
strong. . . . .  For without the prospect of such an award, the party might be 
forced into a nuisance settlement or deterred altogether from exercising his 
rights. 
Assessment Tech., 361 F.3d at 437 (stating “the cost of vindication might otherwise exceed the 
private benefit to the party”). 
 172 Thoroughbred Software Int’l v. Dice Corp., 488 F.3d 352, 362 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing 
Positive Black Talk, Inc. v. Cash Money Records, Inc., 394 F.3d 357, 380 (5th Cir. 2004)).  
 173 See supra notes 43–56 and accompanying text. 
 174 See, e.g., 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 264 (2d Cir 2015) (the Copyright Act 
allows for the imposition of costs and fees only against a party, and not the party’s attorney (citing 
17 U.S.C. § 505)). 
 175 847 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1988). 
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defendant Sony $14,895.46 in attorney’s fees under Rule 11 against the 
plaintiffs’ lawyer but not against the plaintiffs, who were two high school 
teachers.176  The lawyer appealed the sanctions, and the Seventh Circuit stated 
that the merit of his appeal “depends on the reasonableness of his pressing the 
suit as far as he did.”177  Although it concluded that the suit was a “mixture of 
the frivolous and the non-frivolous,”178 it affirmed because it was clear that the 
trial judge awarded sanctions because the suit had not been pursued effectively 
by the attorney.179  The court stated: 
 In the Rule 11 setting, the victims are the lawyer’s adversary, 
other litigants in the court’s queue, and the court itself.  By 
asserting claims without first inquiring whether they have a 
plausible grounding in law and fact, a lawyer can impose on an 
adversary and on the judicial system substantial costs that would 
have been—and should have been—avoided by a reasonable 
prepleading inquiry.180 
The court also noted that plaintiffs’ counsel, a solo practitioner from a small 
town, was not to be criticized for lacking expertise in copyright law and the 
niceties of federal procedure:  
[b]ut the Rule 11 standard, like the negligence standard in tort 
law, is an objective standard . . . [which] . . . makes no allowance 
for the particular circumstances of particular 
practitioners. . . .  There is no ‘locality rule’ in legal 
malpractice . . . the generalist acts at his peril if he brings a suit in 
a field or forum with which he is unacquainted.181  
                                                                                                                  
 176 Id. at 413. 
 177 Id. at 414.  
 178 Id.  
 179 Id. at 417.  This is why the trial court awarded Sony different percentages of the fees it had 
incurred in defending the suit from the time it was filed to the point the plaintiff’s lawyer should 
have realized that the suit was hopeless, and from two other periods during the litigation.  Id. at 
417–18.  The Seventh Circuit said “this method of calculation was lenient.”  Id. at 418.   
 180 Id. at 418. 
 181 Id. at 418–19 (citations omitted).  The court added that in these circumstances counsel 
should seek assistance from a lawyer with the required expertise, or learn the relevant law at every 
step of the case and litigate very carefully.  Id. at 419.  The plaintiffs’ lawyer had “failed to heed 
this precept.”  Id.  The Court of Appeals also granted Sony’s request that plaintiffs’ counsel pay 
the attorney’s fees it incurred defending that portion of his appeal that sought to overturn the 
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Perhaps the defendant in Hays v. Sony Corp. of America did not seek an award 
of attorney’s fees under Section 505 because the plaintiffs’ statutory copyright 
infringement claim was not totally without merit even though most of their 
requests for relief were frivolous.182  Nevertheless, the district court dismissed 
the action, so defendant Sony was the prevailing party.183  The more practical 
reasons for seeking sanctions against the plaintiffs’ attorney under Rule 11 
instead of from the plaintiffs under the Copyright Act might have been that the 
two school teachers would not have had the financial capacity to pay Sony’s 
attorneys and, as noted above, because Section 505 has not been interpreted to 
permit the prevailing party’s fees to be paid by opposing counsel.184   
The trial court in Christian v. Mattel, Inc. invoked Rule 11 to award attorney’s 
fees as a sanction in a copyright infringement suit.185  This decision also might 
have come out the same way under Section 505 of the Copyright Act but for 
the fact the fees were to be paid by the plaintiff’s attorney, not the plaintiff.186  
The plaintiff’s claim was that Mattel’s “Cool Blue” Barbie allegedly infringed the 
copyright on her blonde doll with blue eyes called “Claudene” that resembled a 
University of Southern California cheerleader.187  The plaintiff created this doll 
in 1996 and received copyright registration in 1997.188  She sought damages of 
$2.4 billion and injunctive relief against Mattel.189  The major problem with her 
claim was that Mattel had clear and convincing evidence that its Cool Blue 
Barbie could not, as a matter of law, have infringed the copyright on plaintiff’s 
doll because Cool Blue had been created and copyrighted in 1991, several years 
before the plaintiff’s doll was created.190  Mattel filed a motion for summary 
judgment and tried to convince plaintiff’s lawyer that the complaint was 
frivolous, but he refused to even look at the Cool Blue Barbie doll at a meeting 
                                                                                                                  
judgment on the merits. Id. at 419–20.  The basis for this order was not Rule 11 because an 
appellate court cannot award fees under this Rule. Id. at 420.  
 182 Id. at 415, 417.  
 183 Id. at 420.  
 184 Sony initially sought some $47,000 in fees and related costs against the attorney, and the 
court awarded $14,895.46. Id. at 413.  See, e.g., 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 264 
(2d Cir. 2015) (stating that the Copyright Act allows for the imposition of costs and fees only 
against a party, and not the party’s attorney (citing 17 U.S.C. § 505)). 
 185 286 F.3d 1118, 1121 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 186 The district court had awarded attorney’s fees to Mattel in a related action, and Mattel had 
also sued Christian’s company, Collegiate Doll Company, in which that company’s multiple 
counterclaims against Mattel had been dismissed.  That case settled.  Id. at 1122, 1125.  
 187 Id. at 1122–23.  
 188 Id. at 1123 & n.2.  
 189 Id.  
 190 Id.  
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with Mattel’s lawyer and threw the dolls off a conference table.191  The 
plaintiff’s attorney should have recognized that this copyright infringement 
claim against Mattel had no basis whatsoever.192  
Having been unsuccessful in convincing Hicks to dismiss 
Christian’s action voluntarily, Mattel served Hicks with a motion 
for Rule 11 sanctions . . . argu[ing], among other things, that 
Hicks had signed and filed a frivolous complaint based on the 
legally meritless theory that Mattel’s prior-created head sculptures 
infringed Claudene’s 1997 copyright.  Hicks declined to withdraw 
the complaint during the 21-day safe harbor period provided by 
Rule 11, and Mattel filed its motion [for sanctions].193  
Notwithstanding this motion Hicks fought back and filed additional papers 
but the trial court granted Mattel’s motion for summary judgment.194  In 
subsequently granting Mattel’s Rule 11 motion for sanctions, the trial court said 
that the plaintiff’s attorney had “filed a meritless claim against defendant Mattel.  
A reasonable investigation by Mr. Hicks would have revealed that there was no 
factual foundation for [Christian’s] copyright claim.”195  The court awarded 
Mattel $501,565 in attorney’s fees to be paid by Hicks.196  
Even though the Ninth Circuit later agreed with Hicks that the trial court 
had improperly considered conduct other than that covered by Rule 11 in 
making the fee shifting award, such as discovery abuses and misstatements to 
the court during oral presentations,197 there was no doubt that the filing of this 
frivolous infringement claim warranted sanctions under Rule 11.198  Given the 
fact that the claim was frivolous and without merit, an award of attorney’s fees 
to Mattel under Section 505 of the Copyright Act would have been warranted, 
                                                                                                                  
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id.  
 194 Id. at 1124 (explaining that since Mattel had created the alleged infringing doll long before 
plaintiff created Claudene, Mattel could not have copied the plaintiff’s doll). 
 195 Id.  The plaintiff’s attorney had engaged in other forms of misconduct spelled out by the trial 
court; the court therefore asked Mattel to provide a general description of the work its attorneys 
performed to defend the frivolous claim.  
 196 Id. at 1125–26. 
 197 Id. at 1125, 1130–31. 
 198 Id. at 1129, 1131–32 (holding that the trial court’s order be vacated, and on remand that the 
trial court was to determine whether or not the time spent by Mattel’s attorneys was reasonably 
and appropriately spent in relation to both the patent frivolousness of the complaint and the 
services directly caused by the sanctionable conduct).   
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but it appears that Mattel wanted to send a message to the plaintiff’s attorney, 
Mr. James B. Hicks.199 
There are other decisions in which courts have turned to Rule 11 to award 
attorney’s fees, payable by plaintiff’s counsel, for filing frivolous copyright 
infringement claims which were ultimately dismissed even though an award of 
attorney’s fees payable by the plaintiff under Section 505 might have been 
justified.  In Smith & Johnson, Inc. v. Hedaya Home Fashions, Inc.200 the court 
ordered plaintiff’s attorney to pay the defendant $500 as a Rule 11 sanction for 
filing an infringement claim that was clearly frivolous because the plaintiff had 
stipulated in a related action that it did not own copyrights in certain designs for 
afghan shawls and blankets at issue in this and a prior case filed originally in 
federal court.201  “Plaintiff cannot state a claim with no probability of success 
merely to get back into federal court—a court it was once so anxious to escape.  
In such circumstances, sanctions under Rule 11 are appropriate to deter 
baseless claims.”202   Similarly, in Historical Truth Productions, Inc. v. Sony Pictures 
Entertainment203 the court turned to Rule 11 to sanction the plaintiff’s lawyer 
after granting summary judgment for defendants because no reasonable juror 
could find substantial similarity between plaintiff’s proposed movie, The Last 
Boxer, and defendants’ film Universal Soldier.204  The defendants’ motion for 
sanctions alleged, among other things, that the plaintiff had misrepresented the 
content of the works at issue, and the court agreed that the allegations of 
similarity contained outright falsehoods.  The judge stated that he was  
troubled at this apparent attempt to deceive the court, and I can 
only conclude that plaintiff’s attorney either did not closely 
examine . . . allegations or did not carefully review the two works 
upon which the allegations are based. Defendants have been put 
                                                                                                                  
 199 Id. at 1130–31.  The Court of Appeals also acknowledged alternative bases for fee shifting–
28 U.S.C. § 1927 and inherent authority–and said that, on remand, the trial court, would have an 
opportunity to spell out the bases for its sanctions order. 
 200 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19023 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 201 Id. at *3–4, *24. 
 202 Id. at *24–25.  The defendant’s motion for fees under Section 1927 was denied because even 
though the claim was frivolous, it did not multiply the proceedings.  Id. at *25. 
 203 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17477 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
 204 See generally id. (showing the court’s very thorough and in depth comparison of the two 
works). 
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to needless expense contesting a claim the/that plaintiff’s 
attorney should have recognized as meritless.205 
Here again, an award of attorney’s fees under section 505 might have been 
warranted, and it was the opposing counsel who was obligated to pay 
defendant’s attorney’s fees under Rule 11. 
Similarly, in Robinson v. Double R Records the court also concluded that 
plaintiff’s counsel had violated Rule 11(b)(2) by bringing an infringement claim 
against his client’s co-author because it is settled law that a joint copyright 
owner cannot sue his co-owner for infringement.206  In addition, a claim for 
royalties under a compulsory license had no chance of success because the 
“ ‘Plaintiffs allege[d] that at no time have Defendants obtained a compulsory 
license pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 115,’ ” thus foreclosing any claim.207  The court 
ordered plaintiff’s counsel to pay defendant’s attorney’s fees incurred in 
defending these frivolous claims.208  In this regard, Rule 11(c)(5)(A) makes clear 
that courts cannot impose a monetary sanction against a represented party for 
                                                                                                                  
 205 Id. at *41.  The court asked the defendants’ attorney to document fees and expenses, and 
gave the plaintiff’s attorney an opportunity to respond before making a final determination of the 
sanction at a later conference. 
 206 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS S1459, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 207 Id. (citing Court Order at 14, Robinson v. Double R Records, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS S1459 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 04-4120), 2007 WL 2049724). 
 208 Robinson v. Double R. Records, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS S1459, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(quoting the court’s earlier order granting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion against the plaintiff).  The court 
told the defendant to submit a computation of the attorney’s fees and expenses it incurred in 
defending against the frivolous claims.  See also Tilmon-Jones v. Boladian, 581 Fed. Appx. 493 
(6th Cir. 2014).  The Sixth Circuit discussed the award of attorney’s fees as a sanction for a Rule 
11 violation, to be paid by plaintiff’s counsel, in connection with related disputes over royalties.  
In one dispute the widow attacked a consent order she had entered with Bridgeport Music and 
Bridgeport’s President whereby all causes of action and claims against Bridgeport, including 
future claims, were dismissed with prejudice. She moved to set it aside, alleging fraud by 
defendant’s counsel for withholding documents.  The defendants showed that the documents in 
question had been produced, so the widow withdrew her motion but soon refiled, alleging fraud 
and misconduct.  Id. at 495–96. The trial court explained that its award of $20,000 in fees was 
because counsel had “vexatiously and unreasonably multiplied the proceeding . . . for the 
improper purpose of harassing the defendants.”  The Sixth Circuit affirmed this award after 
noting that it seemed low. Id. at 497.  The second dispute arose subsequent to, and in part from, 
the same consent order and settlement that had disposed of all known and unknown claims 
against Bridgeport.  Accordingly, Bridgeport moved to dismiss and for sanctions, and the trial 
court ruled in its favor on both motions.  The consent order barred the plaintiffs’ claims, so the 
suit was a meritless action lacking factual and legal support.  The Sixth Circuit agreed with making 
a fee award as a sanction but remanded for a better explanation, raising concerns that the amount 
might not have been sufficient for deterrence given counsel’s egregious conduct in filing the suit.  
Id. at 496–99.  This might have been an appropriate case for fee shifting under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. 
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his or her attorney’s violation of the Rule 11(b)(2) obligation to certify that a 
claim is warranted by existing law.209  
Several courts have said that the kind of misconduct that justifies the award 
of fees under Section 1927 could also justify fee shifting under Rule 11 or 
Section 505 of the Copyright Act.   For example, in Burger-Moss v. Steinman the 
plaintiff consented to summary judgement for the defendants on the ground 
that it could not prove that defendants had access to its copyrighted work.210  
The defendants sought sanctions because the plaintiff should have withdrawn 
the suit early in the litigation after all the facts were uncovered and it became 
clear that access could not be established.211  The court granted the motion 
against plaintiff’s counsel who put the defendants to three years of effort and 
expense defending the baseless claims and had thus vexatiously multiplied the 
proceeding to warrant fee shifting under Section 1927.  In addition, there had 
been a clear violation of Rule 11(b)(2).212  
IV.  CHOOSING BETWEEN THE ALTERNATIVE BASES FOR FEES  
The decisions discussed in this Article show that although neither the 
Copyright Act nor Rule 11 mandate the award of attorney’s fees, and although 
both grant considerable discretion to the trial judge awarding attorney’s fees, 
there are differences.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated in 
Lieb v. Topstone Industries: 
Rule 11 may be applied to only a small segment of the litigation, 
but the Copyright Act looks to the whole of the case.  
Furthermore, Rule 11 is more insistent on imposing sanctions 
where objectively a case lacks merit than is the Copyright Act.  
However, the rule offers a broader selection of remedies. 
Although it is possible that the Copyright Act and Rule 11 may in 
some circumstances apply to identical conduct, it should be 
                                                                                                                  
 209 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(5)(A) (showing sanctions can be imposed against a pro se litigant).  The 
obligations under FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b) explicitly apply to unrepresented parties.  See, e.g., Smith v. 
Education People, Inc., 233 F.R.D. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that a Rule 11 sanction, in the 
form of an injunction against duplicative litigation, was warranted based on the pro se plaintiff filing 
collaterally estopped copyright infringement actions against defendant’s vendors and customers). 
 210 Burger-Moss v. Steinman, 127 F.R.D. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
 211 Id.  
 212 Id. at 453.  
35
Shipley: Discouraging Frivolous Copyright Infringement Claims: Fee Shiftin
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2016
68 J. INTELL. PROP. L.  [Vol. 24:33 
 
understood that there should be no duplication of any recovery 
for counsel fees.213 
The ‘overlap’ cases, in which a prevailing defendant has sought attorney’s 
fees under Section 505 of the Copyright Act, and as a sanction under Rule 11, 
present a fairly standard scenario: (a) the plaintiff files an infringement claim 
that is objectively unreasonable and frivolous; (b) the defendant files a motion 
to dismiss or for summary judgment and also serves plaintiff with a motion for 
sanctions pursuant to Rule 11(c)(2) that spells out the serious defects with the 
complaint; (c) the plaintiff fails to withdraw or correct the complaint within the 
twenty-one day safe harbor provided by Rule 11; (d) the motion for sanctions is 
then filed with the court; (e) the court grants the defendant’s motion to dismiss 
or for summary judgment; (f) the defendant seeks attorney’s fees under Section 
505; and (g) the court has to rule on this request and on the defendant’s motion 
for sanctions under Rule 11.214  In some of these situations, the courts also 
discuss 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and their inherent equitable authority to impose 
sanctions.  Here are the key principles which can be drawn from these ‘overlap’ 
decisions.  
No Duplicative Awards: These bases for awarding attorney’s fees are 
alternative grounds and there will be only one award.  For instance, in United 
States ex rel. Taylor v. Times Herald Record Newspaper an inmate at a correctional 
facility claimed that a series of newspaper articles about the Shawangunk region 
in New York infringed the copyright on his unpublished science fiction novel 
titled Shawangunk.215  The trial court granted summary judgment for the 
defendants against this pro se litigant, finding that his allegations were totally 
without merit.216  The defendants’ application for costs and attorney’s fees 
under Section 505 was granted with the court acknowledging that despite this 
pro se plaintiff’s lack of legal training, his claim of infringement was objectively 
                                                                                                                  
 213 788 F.2d 151, 158 (3d Cir. 1986).  Lieb was discussed and cited with approval by the 
Supreme Court in its Fogerty decision.  510 U.S. at 534 n.19 (1994). 
 214 Cf. Gal v. Viacom International, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).  The court 
ultimately denied the defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion making any award of attorney’s fees under 
section 505 inappropriate.  The court was, however, troubled by plaintiff’s counsel failing to 
discover and correct an error in the initial filing, even after defendant’s counsel had pointed out 
the mistake in a letter.  Nevertheless, it did not award sanctions because defendant’s counsel’s 
letter did not comply with Rule 11 in that it was not in the form of a motion. Id. at 307–09. 
 215 1992 WL 236163 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
 216 Id. at *1 (stating “[n]ot one of the eighty-four purported instances of copying in the 
Shawangunk articles is ‘similar,’ as that word is used in common parlance, much less ‘substantially 
similar,’ as that term is used in copyright jurisprudence, to plaintiff’s unpublished novel, 
Shawangunk”). 
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frivolous and without any apparent justification, and that it “would be unfair to 
require the defendants to bear the cost of attorney’s fees.”217  It concluded in 
response to the defendants’ motion for sanctions under FED. R. CIV. P. 11 that 
given the differences between the newspaper articles and his novel, the plaintiff 
“should have known that his infringement claim was entirely fanciful” and said 
that the defendants were entitled to sanctions under Rule 11.218  Still, the court 
decided against assessing sanctions because attorney’s fees were being awarded 
to the prevailing defendant under Section 505.219  The court added that if the 
fee award under Section 505 was vacated, then the FED. R. CIV. P. 11 sanctions 
would be assessed.220  In any event, an award under Rule 11 would have been 
duplicative of the Section 505 award, and there should be no duplication of any 
recovery of counsel fees.221 
This point was also made in Warner Bros., Inc. v. Dae Rim Trading,222 which 
was a complicated suit involving characters from the movie Gremlins.  The court 
ultimately found that an infringement claim by Warner Brothers was 
unreasonable, that it had continued to litigate after it became unreasonable, and 
that even though it had not acted in bad faith, its conduct was vexatious, 
oppressive and unreasonable.223  The Court decided to award attorney’s fees to 
the prevailing party224 and then added that the defendants had also asked for an 
award of attorney’s fees under Rule 11, but “[s]ince attorney’s fees are being 
awarded to defendants under 17 U.S.C. § 505, we need not stop to determine 
that, as seems likely, they also be awarded under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.”225  Here 
also, an award of fees under Rule 11 would have duplicated the fees awarded 
under Section 505.226  
Who pays the fees; the attorney or the client: Another principle that 
emerges from these overlap cases is that liability for the payment of attorney’s 
fees under Section 505 can be imposed only against the losing party, not his or 
                                                                                                                  
 217 Id. at *2.  
 218 Id. 
 219 Id.  
 220 Id.  
 221 See Lieb v. Topstone Industries, Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 158 (3d Cir. 1986).  
 222 677 F. Supp. 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
 223 Id. at 773.  
 224 Id. at 772–73. 
 225 Id. at 774. 
 226 See also Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 615 F. Supp. 838, 864–65 (S.D.N.Y. 
1985) (the award of fees under Rule 11 was not supplementary to the award of fees under the 
Copyright Act and the Lanham Act but an additional foundation for reaching the same result).  
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her attorney.227  On the other hand, fee awards under Section 1927 are generally 
paid by counsel,228 violations of the obligations imposed by Rule 11(b)(2) must 
be paid by counsel, and  joint and several liability is possible for violations of 
the obligations in Rule 11(b)(3).   
For example, in Zuk v. Eastern Pennsylvania Psychiatric Institute the trial court 
awarded attorney’s fees under Section 505 and imposed sanctions under Rule 
11, with the losing plaintiff paying fees under 505 and his lawyer paying fees 
under Rule 11.229  The plaintiff, Dr. Zuk, was a psychologist who worked on the 
faculty of the Eastern Pennsylvania Psychiatric Institute (EPPI) in the early 
1970s.230  He had a technician film some of his family therapy sessions, and the 
films were then made available for rental.231  He also wrote a book containing 
transcripts of some of these sessions which was copyrighted in 1975.232  Long 
after Zuk left EPPI he filed suit alleging that EPPI was infringing his copyright 
on the book by continuing to rent the films.233  EPPI moved to dismiss under 
Rule 12(b)(6) on the ground that the copyright on the book did not extend to 
the films, and because these claims were barred by the statute of limitations.234  
EPPI also notified Zuk’s attorney of its intention to move for sanctions under 
Rule 11 on the ground that he had failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry into 
the facts and the law.235  The motion to dismiss was granted.236  EPPI next 
moved for attorney’s fees under Section 505 of the Copyright Act and shortly 
thereafter moved for sanctions under Rule 11.237  The trial court ultimately held 
that the plaintiff and his lawyer were jointly and severally liable to EPPI for 
                                                                                                                  
 227 Fharmacy Records v. Nassar, 572 F. Supp. 2d 869, 881 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (Section 505 does 
not expressly authorize an award from an attorney for a party); 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, 791 
F.3d 247, 264 (2d Cir. 2015) (the Copyright Act allows for the imposition of costs and fees only 
against a party, not the party’s attorney); cf. Neff v. Vidmark, Inc., 923 F.2d 746, 747 (9th Cir. 
1991) (when a statute authorizing the award of attorneys’ fees to prevailing parties does not 
mention an award against counsel the appropriate inference in that an award against attorneys is 
not authorized). 
 228 Section 1927 allows a court to require an attorney to satisfy personally cost and fees.  16 
Casa Duse, LLC. v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 264 (2d Cir. 2015); Royal Oak Entm’t v. City of Royal 
Oak, 486 F. Supp. 2d 675, 679 (E.D. Mich. 2007) (a court may hold parties and counsel jointly 
and severally liable under Section 1927).  
 229 103 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 230 Id. 
 231 Id. 
 232 Id. 
 233 Id.   
 234 Id. 
 235 Id. 
 236 Id. 
 237 Id.  
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attorney’s fees of $15,000.00, concluding that joint and several liability was 
permissible under Rule 11 and under the general authorization in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1927.238  Dr. Zuk settled with EPPI for $6,250 in fees, and the attorney 
appealed.239 
The Third Circuit held that the trial court did not err in making an award of 
fees under Section 505 to the prevailing party because this was the kind of case 
in which an award is justified.240  It then stated that “under the statutory 
directive, the attorney’s fee is considered an element of costs and therefore 
liability attached only to Dr. Zuk [the party] and not his attorney . . . . Dr. Zuk 
has settled his liability, and the appellant’s [Dr. Zuk’s attorney] liability under 
the Copyright Act should not detain us.  There is none.”241  In other words, the 
fee award under the Copyright Act goes against the party as an element of costs, 
and the liability of the party’s attorney for a portion of those fees had to be 
justified under different authority.  The Court of Appeals turned to the 
attorney’s possible liability under Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and determined 
that meaningful review was impossible because the trial court had failed to 
explain what part of the award was based on Rule 11 and what was attributable 
to the perceived violation of section 1927.242  
Even though the Court of Appeals vacated the award, it addressed the 
proper type and amount of sanctions to be awarded pursuant to Rule 11.243  It 
said that there was no error in imposing sanctions because the lawyer (1) had 
not conducted a reasonable factual investigation prior to filing the suit and thus 
violated his duties under Rule 11(b)(3),244 and (2) his inquiry into basic 
copyright fundamentals was so weak as to cause him to pursue a course of 
conduct not warranted by existing law in violation of his obligations under Rule 
11(b)(2).245  
                                                                                                                  
 238 Id. at 297 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1927). 
 239 Id. at 296–97. 
 240 Id. at 297. 
 241 Id.   
 242 Id. at 298.  
 243 Id.  Cf. Fharmacy Records v. Nassar, 572 F. Supp. 2d 869, 880–81 (E.D. Mich. 2008) 
(awarding fees to the prevailing defendant who had warded off a frivolous case to be paid by 
plaintiff and plaintiff’s counsel under sections 505 and 1927).  
 244 103 F.3d at 299–300 (holding counsel had not investigated whether the film had been 
distributed at all during the three year period prior to filing the suit and the statute of limitations 
problem was obvious).  
 245 Id. at 300.  The case was remanded for the trial court to determine whether the specific 
sanctions against the plaintiff’s attorney were contrary to the spirit of Rule 11.  Id. at 301.  In 
short, the award of sanctions against the plaintiff’s attorney under Rule 11 was affirmed but 
vacated as to the type and amount of sanctions imposed under the Rule and under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1927.  The Third Circuit noted that monetary awards under Rule 11 are not encouraged, but 
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Explaining the exercise of discretion: These “overlap cases” show that 
the kind of misconduct which justifies an award of fees under Section 505 of 
the Copyright Act might also justify fee shifting under Rule 11 or section 1927.  
The courts have also noted that fee awards under these provisions are 
discretionary, and that this discretion can be abused.246  Accordingly, another 
principle is that the trial court has to provide a sufficient explanation for its 
exercise of discretion.  It has to be clear in explaining its rationale for the award 
of fees.  For example, in Burger-Moss v. Steinman the plaintiff consented to 
summary judgement for the defendants on the ground that it could not prove 
that defendants had access to its copyrighted work.247  The defendants sought 
sanctions because the plaintiff should have withdrawn its claim early in the 
litigation after facts were uncovered which made it clear that access could not 
be established.248 The court granted the motion against plaintiff’s counsel 
explaining that he put the defendants to three years of effort and expense 
defending the baseless claims and had thus vexatiously multiplied the 
proceeding to warrant fees under section 1927.249  In addition, the Court said 
there had been a clear violation of Rule 11.250  
In 16 Casa Duse, LLC. v. Merkin, the Second Circuit held that the trial court 
had not abused its discretion in holding the plaintiff and its attorney jointly and 
severally liable for costs and attorney’s fees under both section 1927 and section 
505 of the Copyright Act.251  The lawyer had argued that the Copyright Act 
allows for the imposition of fees only against a party, not a party’s attorney, but 
the appellate court noted that the trial court awarded the fees under “both the 
Copyright Act and 28 U.S.C. § 1927.  The latter statute allows a court to require 
an attorney to ‘satisfy personally’ costs and fees. . . . The district court’s 
allocation of costs and fees was not contrary to law.”252 
The Ninth Circuit has stated that a trial court’s decision to impose sanctions 
in reliance on Section 1927 or its inherent authority requires the court to 
                                                                                                                  
they are not forbidden either.  Id. (quoting Doering v. Union County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 
857 F.2d 191, 194 (3d Cir. 1988) (the Court of Appeals told the lower courts that fee shifting is 
one of several methods of achieving the goals of Rule 11 and that alternative sanctions should be 
considered to adequately deter undesirable behavior)).  
 246 Burger-Moss v. Steinman, 127 F.R.D. 452, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).  When this opinion was 
issued sanctions under Rule 11 were mandatory.  The 1993 revisions changed this to a ‘may’ 
impose sanctions Rule.  See Rule 11(c)(1).  
 247 127 F.R.D. 452, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
 248 Id.; see also supra notes 210–12 and accompanying text. 
 249 127 F.R.D. at 453. 
 250 Id.   
 251 791 F.3d 247, 264–65 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 252 Id. at 264. 
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articulate separately the grounds for the sanction so as to assure that the 
conduct at issue falls within the scope of the sanctions remedy.253  To impose 
sanctions under inherent authority the court has to “make an explicit finding 
that counsel’s conduct ‘constituted, or was tantamount, to bad faith.’ ”254  In 
other words, it has to be able to explain how counsel committed misconduct in 
an unreasonable and vexatious manner that violated 28 U.S.C. § 1927,255 or how 
it constituted the kind of bad faith that comes under the court’s inherent 
authority to sanction.256  When a court turns to section 1927 to require 
opposing counsel to pay the other side’s attorney’s fees it needs to explain its 
reasoning or it will risk being overturned for lacking analysis.257 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Many cases in which attorney’s fees are awarded under section 505 will not 
support an award of fees under Rule 11, section 1927 or inherent authority.  
However, in those instances in which a court can conclude that a plaintiff’s 
copyright claim is frivolous or objectively unreasonable to justify a fee award 
under Section 505, there often will be significant overlap with the standard 
justifications for awarding fees under Rule 11, section 1927, and sometimes 
under inherent authority.  In these “overlap cases,” if the prevailing party and 
the court want to punish and deter opposing counsel instead of visiting his or 
her sins on the plaintiff, then it would be appropriate to turn to Rule 11 and its 
provisions on sanctions, or to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, to justify the fee award instead 
of relying on Section 505 of the Copyright Act.  Moreover, if the misconduct is 
serious enough the court might be able turn to Rule 11, Section 1927 or 
inherent powers along with Section 505 to hold the losing counsel and his or 
her client jointly and severally liable for attorney’s fees and costs.258 
                                                                                                                  
 253 Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 1119, 1131 (9th Cir. 2002).  
 254 Primus Auto. Fin. Serv. Inc. v. Batarse, 115 F.3d 644, 648 (9th Cir. 1997).  
 255 BKB v. Maui Police Department, 276 F.3d 1091, 1107 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 256 Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 991–92 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 257 Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009); cf. Mahan v. Roc Nation, LLC, 
2016 Copyright Law Decisions ¶ 30,986 at 48,951 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (the award of attorney’s fees 
against the plaintiff was justified under Section 505 but the plaintiff’s counsel could not be 
sanctioned under the court’s inherent power because although his claims lacked a colorable basis, 
they were not made in bad faith).  See also Lieb v. Topstone Industries, Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 158 (3d 
Cir. 1986) (remand ordered because the record gave the appellate court no basis for reviewing the 
trial court’s exercise of discretion under the Copyright Act and Rule 11).  
 258  See, e.g., Burger-Moss v. Steinman, 127 F.R.D. 452, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Fharmacy Records 
v. Nassar, 572 F. Supp. 2d 869, 881 (E.D. Mich. 2008). 
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